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Advising Terrorism: Material Support,
Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech
Peter Margulies*
Ever since Brandenburg v. Ohio, departures from content neutrality under the First
Amendment have received strict scrutiny. However, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project (“HLP”), the Supreme Court decided that the perils of content regulation were
less pressing than was the need to curb the human capital of groups, such as Hamas,
designated as foreign terrorist organizations (“DFTOs”). As a result, the Court upheld
a statute that bars “material support” of terrorist organizations, ruling that the statute
bars speech coordinated with DFTOs, including training in negotiation or the use of
international law. Some commentators have labeled HLP as heralding a new
McCarthyism. This Article argues that critics who condemn HLP as the reincarnation
of Cold War content regulation overlook the tailored quality of the decision’s hybrid
scrutiny model, its roots in the Framers’ concerns about foreign influence, and its
surprising parallels with constitutional justifications for professional regulation.
HLP is not the marked departure that critics claim. Just as professional regulation
limits lawyers’ use of pretrial publicity, HLP reduced the impact of asymmetries in
information that terrorist groups exploit. To constrain government, HLP’s framework
of hybrid scrutiny also provides a safe harbor for the independent expression of ideas,
and for scholars, journalists, human rights monitors, and attorneys.
Nevertheless, HLP’s critics are right that the Court’s decision is flawed. Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion invited confusion about the First Amendment status of lending
“legitimacy” to violence, which could quickly drain the safe harbor that the Court
created for independent advocacy. The opinion also made a studied show of deference
to official sources, disdaining independent accounts of terrorist groups’ penchant for
defection. Only the next case will tell if these flaws were minor missteps in a balanced
decision or signs of a more severe conflict with First Amendment values.

* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I was co-counsel on an amicus
curiae brief that asked the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of the federal materialsupport statute, 18 U.SC. § 2339B, and to carve out safe harbors for journalists, scholars, human rights
groups, and attorneys. See Brief for Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public Officials with Experience
in Terrorism-Related Issues as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 507069. Portions of this Article were presented
at a conference sponsored by the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law,
entitled “The Constitution and National Security: The First Amendment Under Attack,” in November
2010. I thank Bill Araiza, Renee Knake, and Larry Rosenthal for comments on a previous draft.
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Introduction
Attempts to regulate foreign terrorist groups expose ambivalence in
First Amendment jurisprudence regarding asymmetries in information.
On the one hand, courts apply intermediate scrutiny in the commercial
speech context, asserting that information asymmetries between seller
1
and consumer justify regulation. On the other hand, the specter of an
information gap between government and citizen has driven heightened
2
scrutiny of measures regulating political speech. Interactions with
foreign powers such as terrorist groups summon both concerns.
Just as U.S. corporations turn to bad accounting to present a
3
pleasing profile to investors, terrorist organizations with ongoing plans
for attacking innocents apply a veneer of nonviolence to attract financial
4
contributions. Yet democracies ought to protect speech that conveys
accurate information about events abroad, even if that information
challenges government policy. Because of this tension, regulation of
speech coordinated by terrorist groups should trigger a hybrid form of
scrutiny, which the Supreme Court outlined in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project (“HLP”), upholding Congress’s prohibition on material
5
support to terrorist groups.
HLP has already attracted significant scholarly debate, with some
commentators arguing that the statute and the Court’s decision harken
6
back to the oppressive content regulation of the Cold War. Justice

1. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651–52 n.14 (1985)
(upholding regulation requiring disclosures in lawyers’ contingency fee agreements on the grounds
that a commercial speaker does not have a fundamental right “not to divulge accurate information
regarding his services”). Information asymmetries are gaps in information that favor one party to the
transaction. For example, cases like Zauderer assume that the lawyer has more information than the
client about the provision of legal services. Because consumers lack the ability to share and retrieve
information, the market will not squeeze out incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners. Regulation
attempts to correct this market failure. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational
Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 277, 280 (2004) (“[I]nformation asymmetries
between producers and consumers [are] widely accepted as justifying certain kinds of regulatory
interventions.”).
2. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing the
importance of “free trade in ideas” which government cannot monopolize).
3. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1139, 1151 (2005) (discussing the
lack of transparency in accounting of some corporations).
4. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
Congress could prohibit financial contributions to foreign terrorist groups because such contributions
may support both violent and nonviolent purposes), cert. denied sub nom., Humanitarian Law Project
v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
5. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724–30 (2010). The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 933 (9th Cir. 2009).
6. Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 Ind. L.J. 543, 588–92
(2011) (criticizing the statute’s rationale and implementation); Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in
Transborder Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 995–96
(2011) [hereinafter Zick, The First Amendment in Transborder Perspective] (arguing that the HLP
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Breyer fueled this argument with a dissent, joined by two of his
colleagues, which criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the
7
majority as based on speculation, not principle. Others have suggested
8
that the decision was a pragmatic adaptation to conflicting values. The
merits of the debate inform our understanding of free speech, terrorism,
and the role of foreign affairs.
This Article views HLP as a hybrid form of scrutiny that limits
terrorist groups’ exploitation of information asymmetries, while
preserving safe harbors for advocacy that challenges government policy.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in HLP navigated between
the opposing information gaps of First Amendment doctrine. On one
side is the asymmetry between seller and consumer that dominates
commercial speech cases: Sellers typically know more about the products
they sell, and the government can prevent deceptive speech that
exacerbates that asymmetry. The other side features the gap between
government and citizen that figures so prominently in cases involving
political speech: Public officials know more about the workings of
government than citizens do, and protecting political speech help citizens
close the gap. In addressing these asymmetries, Chief Justice Roberts
distinguished speech in agency relationships with designated foreign
9
terrorist organizations (“DFTOs”), and the expression of ideas outside
10
such relationships. The former are subject to “rules of the road.” These
rules promote cooperation between parties and reduce asymmetries in

decision took “provincial” view that unduly discounted the value of transborder exchange of ideas);
Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders,
85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1543, 1579 (2010) (expressing concern about First Amendment consequences
of the statute’s enforcement); Leading Cases, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 179, 259, 264–69 (2010) (critiquing the
Court’s language and reasoning). Professor David Cole of the Georgetown University Law Center,
who led the legal challenge to the provision, has also been a salient scholarly critic. See David Cole,
The Roberts Court v. Free Speech, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 19, 2010, at 81; see also David Cole, Enemy
Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism 60–62 (2003)
[hereinafter Cole, Enemy Aliens] (arguing that the ban on material support to terrorist groups
violates First Amendment rights); David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorism,
and the Right of Association, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 246–50. For additional criticism of the materialsupport statutes, see Raneta Lawson Mack & Michael J. Kelly, Equal Justice in the Balance:
America’s Legal Responses to the Emerging Terrorist Threat 208–10 (2004).
7. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the Chief Justice’s opinion, while Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor joined Justice Breyer’s dissent. Id. at 2712 (majority opinion).
8. See Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of
the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 Ind. L.J. 1, 71 (2011); see also William D. Araiza, Citizens
United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts,
40 Stetson L. Rev. 821, 830–31 (2011); cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J.
978, 1010 n.150 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s safe harbor for domestic groups safeguards free
expression).
9. DFTOs are designated by the Secretary of State. See infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
10. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22.
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information that undermine trust. In contrast, the expression of ideas
outside such relationships receives a safe harbor.
An unexpected parallel emerges in case law on agency relationships,
including those between lawyer and client. Since clients can use a lawyer
to gain another’s trust and then defect, courts have structured lawyer11
client relationships to diminish this risk. On occasion, this focus on
agents following the rules of the road spills over from commercial to
political speech: Courts require lawyers for a party in litigation to refrain
from prejudicial pretrial publicity, even if the lawyer is truthful and
addresses matters of public concern, because courts worry that
laypersons who comprise the jury pool will not adequately discount the
12
lawyer’s remarks. Courts also give lawyers a safe harbor by permitting
13
public remarks by lawyers not involved in the matter. These rules guard
against both lawyer-created information asymmetries and gaps in public
knowledge about the functioning of the justice system.
The uses and abuses of agency have been a particular concern in the
domain of foreign affairs. Establishing rules of the road to regulate
foreign agents has been a core mission since the dawn of American
constitutionalism. The Framers recognized that the geographic, cultural,
and political gap between American and foreign states would compound
information asymmetries: American officials lacked reliable information
about the designs of other nations, and other nations lacked accurate
14
15
information about us. The Foreign Gifts clause emerged from this
16
17
concern, as did Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation. In the
twentieth century, Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act
18
to require disclosure of the source of foreign political propaganda. To
limit revenue to foreign powers like Cuba whose ventures were adverse

11. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1336 (2010)
(upholding disclosure and advice mandates that communicate adverse consequences of bankruptcy to
prospective petitioners, and therefore also reassure creditors that petitioners are not abusing access to
relief); cf. Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
639, 674–85 (2011) (arguing for more robust protections for attorney speech).
12. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991); cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Free
Speech for Lawyers, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 305, 400 (2001) (discussing the rationale for limiting
pretrial publicity).
13. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1062 (noting that the provision at issue concerned the attorney’s
representation of a client in a pending case).
14. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs,
40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1471, 1511–27 (1999) (discussing John Marshall’s perspective on foreign
affairs). For further discussion of Marshall’s view, see infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
15. U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 8.
16. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 336–41 (1993).
18. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2010)); see Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 467 (1987).
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to U.S. interests, Congress and the executive branch enacted travel bans
19
with exceptions for scholars, journalists, and human rights groups.
However, fears about information asymmetries in the foreign arena
have also impinged on the expression of ideas. This darker strand
appeared early with the Alien and Sedition Acts, which criminalized
20
speech critical of the government. It surfaced again in repression of
anarchists, in arrest and deportation of opponents to American
21
intervention in World War I, and in the blacklisting and loyalty
22
investigations of the Cold War. Such measures widen the knowledge
gap between citizens and government.
Courts have reviewed these measures in terms that echo the division
of commercial and political speech. Measures such as travel restrictions
23
and disclosure requirements have elicited less demanding scrutiny.
However, starting with the Cold War, the courts have constructed a safe
harbor for political opinions, initially through the canon that counsels
24
interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional questions.
Congress’s 1996 bar on material support of groups designated by the
25
Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations (DFTOs), passed
after the Oklahoma City bombing, posed a challenge to this neat division
of judicial approaches. Congress acted because it saw terrorist groups
26
such as Hamas as quintessential defecting parties with no respect for
19. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1984).
20. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of
1798 to the War on Terrorism 36 (2004).
21. Cf. Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States
75–85 (1979) (describing wartime censorship and targeting of immigrants who were viewed as
subversives).
22. See Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 6, at 129–53; Robert Justin Goldstein, American
Blacklist: The Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations 190–210 (2008) (discussing
listing of domestic organizations and restrictions imposed on those who had participated in these
groups). Targeting of political opponents also figured in some moves by the Bush administration. See
Peter Margulies, Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush Administration 44, 127, 131–34
(2010) (discussing the administration’s efforts to target dissenters and political opponents, and the
firing of federal prosecutors who refused to acquiesce in these goals).
23. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1336 (2010)
(upholding disclosure requirements); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (upholding travel
restrictions).
24. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129–30 (1958) (avoiding the constitutional question by
holding that Congress had not authorized singling out the illustrator Rockwell Kent for denial of a
passport based on his expression of unpopular political ideas).
25. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110 Stat.
1214, 1250–53 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010)). Material support is defined as “any
property, tangible or intangible, or service, including financial services . . . training, [and] expert advice
or assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2010). For background on the Act, see Robert M. Chesney,
The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 Harv. J. on Legis.
1, 12–18 (2005).
26. See Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad 135
(2006). Hamas, which takes its name from an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, was founded
in 1987. The group’s charter calls for destruction of the State of Israel and establishment of a religious
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27

global rules of the road. Like corporate officials who engage in
misconduct within the U.S., DFTOs are bad accountants. Courts have
repeatedly applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold the bar on financial
assistance to DFTOs because DFTOs that accept contributions for a
school or hospital can funnel those resources to instrumentalities of
28
violence, or free up other resources for violent goals.
However, DFTOs’ bad accounting goes further, because DFTOs
exploit human as well as financial capital. They use agents just as bad
actors in private law do: to maximize their returns for defection from
cooperative agreements. For example, DFTOs use truces as tactical
devices to refurbish their weapons stocks and plan an expedient
29
resumption of violence. An outside negotiator for a DFTO, whatever
her intent, functions like a lawyer in a financing agreement where the
borrower takes the money and runs: as a reputation engineer who draws
30
down her goodwill for the benefit of a defecting party. Capitalizing on
these asymmetries, DFTOs routinely use truces for tactical purposes and
manipulate international law by mobilizing ostensibly neutral sites such
31
as refugee camps. Curbing this activity requires limits on a narrow band
of speech: communication between an agent and a DFTO on putatively
32
nonviolent matters such as the timing and negotiation of truces.
Regulation of this kind clearly calls for more than the intermediate
scrutiny applied to curbs on financial capital. The hybrid scrutiny that the
Court employed to uphold the regulation of human capital in HLP
responded to this need.
The Court held that Congress could prohibit assisting DFTOs in
33
negotiations and in training them in the use of international law. The
opinion stressed the pervasive information asymmetries in the realm of

state on land currently comprising Israel proper, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Hamas seeks to
supplant the more secular Palestinian Authority as the representative of the Palestinian people. To
achieve these goals, it has implemented a coordinated strategy involving political activity, social
welfare programs, and violence against both Israelis and moderate Palestinians. Id. at 8, 117.
27. Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) (“[T]errorist groups
systematically conceal their [violent] activities behind charitable, social, and political fronts.” (quoting
Levitt, supra note 26, at 2–3)).
28. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ll material
support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals.”), cert. denied sub nom., Humanitarian
Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); see also Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (refusing to require that financial assistance be
directly traceable to a terrorist act because money is fungible).
29. Cf. Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, 31 Int’l Security 49,
72–75 (2006) (explaining incentives for violent extremists to undermine peace negotiations).
30. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 Yale L.J. 239, 253–57 (1984) (discussing lawyers as “transaction cost engineers”).
31. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729–30.
32. Id. at 2722–23, 2729.
33. Id. at 2731.
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34

foreign affairs. Whatever the intent of the agent who aided the DFTO,
Chief Justice Roberts explained, Congress has a compelling interest in
35
regulating this exploitation of agency relationships. Moreover, Congress
throughout its history has sent signals that trigger reciprocity with allies
36
or neutral powers. The material-support statute serves that purpose by
limiting agency relationships with DFTOs that prey on another country’s
37
civilians.
A hybrid model that regulates principal-agent political speech must
echo the pretrial-publicity paradigm in providing safe harbors for
questioning government policy. Acknowledging this imperative, Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion narrowly defined speech-related material
support as entailing a close degree of interaction with the DFTO, akin to
38
an agency relationship. Only a narrowly defined nexus leaves
constitutionally adequate space for independent advocacy, journalism,
scholarship, mediation, and human rights monitoring. Finally, the
avoidance canon also requires protection of lawyers who assist in
challenging a terrorist group’s designation and who provide legal advice
39
reasonably related to that objective. By crafting a hybrid model that
targets a limited precinct of principal-agent speech while creating safe
harbors for most expressive content, the Court addressed the challenge
of terrorist groups’ bad accounting and preserved constitutional values.
Like any hybrid, HLP sacrifices doctrinal elegance for pragmatic
results. The more streamlined doctrinal course would have been either to
strike down the statute under strict scrutiny or to uphold the bar on
agency relationships as regulating conduct rather than speech. However,
each of these ostensibly smoother routes had its own perils. Striking
down the statute would have permitted a DFTO to attract more financial
support with facile gestures toward reform. Conversely, upholding the
statute under intermediate scrutiny might have emboldened the
government to enact even more aggressive measures. The Court’s
approach reduced the impact of information asymmetries favoring
DFTOs without expanding the gap between citizen and government. In

34. Id. at 2727–28.
35. Id. at 2725–27.
36. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118–21 (1804)
(interpreting the statute to comply with the duty under international law to respect neutrals’
property).
37. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726–27 (discussing the importance of the U.S.’s
signals to countries, such as Turkey, which face daunting problems with terrorist violence).
38. Id. at 2721–22.
39. Cf. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–48 (2001) (invalidating restrictions on
funding for legal challenges to welfare restrictions). This Article counters scholars who have suggested
that HLP targets legal representation. See, e.g., Knake, supra note 11, at 656–67 (expressing concern
about HLP’s implications for lawyers); Margaret Tarkington, Attorney Speech and the Right to an
Impartial Adjudicator, 30 Rev. Litig. 849, 877–78 (2011).
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opting for flexibility, the Court took a page from its past practice, which
often stressed solicitude for disadvantaged groups over precise placement
40
in doctrinal pigeonholes.
Unfortunately, the Court’s flexibility turned into imprecision on
three issues: (1) the deference owed to the government, (2) the public
interest in curbing the “legitimacy” of DFTOs, and (3) the vagueness of
41
the statute as applied to the plaintiffs. First, Chief Justice Roberts’s
42
opinion seemed studied in its deference to governmental sources.
43
Ample independent reports cite DFTOs’ chronic defections. The
Court’s reluctance to cite those independent reports prompted an
unnecessary expansion of deference.
In addition, the opinion needlessly roiled First Amendment doctrine
by failing to clearly distinguish between functional and ideational senses
of lending “legitimacy” to DFTOs. If Congress could silence any speaker
who enhanced a DFTO’s legitimacy, its power would have no stopping
44
point, as Justice Breyer noted in dissent. Chief Justice Roberts viewed
legitimacy in a narrower functional sense, as an advantage in fundraising
45
and recruitment yielded by an agent. But use of the term “legitimacy”
confused the issue.
Finally, the majority failed to explain clearly why the statutory term,
46
“training,” which Congress defined as the teaching of a “specific skill,”
was not vague as applied to the plaintiffs’ goal of teaching DFTOs about
the application of international law to the resolution of disputes. The
majority could have been making a functional argument that such
teaching involves concrete interactions with the DFTO about its core
activities, such as ongoing violence that the group might wish to
47
rationalize with a strained reading of international law. However, the
majority could also have been making a substantive point about the
40. See Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 53–60 (1996)
(discussing a case-by-case approach to inequality in decisions such as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), in which the Court struck down a state constitutional provision that barred the enactment of
measures remedying discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Implementing the Constitution 45–55 (2001) (discussing institutional concerns, such as manageable
standards, that influence role of doctrine in particular cases); Richard H. Pildes, The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 86–99 (2004) (arguing that fixating
on doctrine can frustrate the larger cause of political reform).
41. Following the Court, I use the term “plaintiffs” to describe the individuals and organizations
challenging § 2339B. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
42. See id. at 2725.
43. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 72–75.
44. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2725–27 (majority opinion) (citing the government affidavit ten times within three
pages, while citing only two independent sources).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) (2010).
47. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729. Chief Justice Roberts clearly contemplated this
broader sense with reference to other activities that the statute prohibits. Id. at 2722 (“[T]he term
‘service’ [means activity] performed in coordination with, or at the direction of a [DFTO].”).
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48

relative complexity of certain topics. In an age when the Internet offers
profuse knowledge about any subject, a substantive test of complexity
seems both anachronistic and difficult to apply. The Court should have
recognized that effective rules of the road require attention to detail.
The Article is divided into five Parts. Part I discusses agency as a
double-edged sword that can promote cooperation or facilitate defection.
It then analyzes information asymmetries as a basis for regulating the
legal profession, where the overlap between commercial and political
speech has challenged doctrinal coherence. Part II recounts the history of
American concern with the information asymmetries exploited by
foreign agents, and the sometimes blurred line since the Founding Era
between enacting rules of the road and chilling free expression. Part III
outlines Congress’s effort in § 2339B to combat information asymmetries
that assist DFTOs. Because DFTOs use both financial and human capital
to raise funds and boost recruitment, addressing these information
asymmetries requires the regulation of agency relationships with DFTOs.
Part III also addresses the flaws in the majority’s handling of deference
and legitimacy. Part IV focuses on the safe harbor that the Court
constructed for independent advocacy. It suggests that both the logic of
the Court’s opinion and the avoidance of constitutional questions require
a safe harbor that includes journalism, scholarship, mediation, and
human rights monitoring, as well as legal representation. Finally, Part V
takes a step back to discuss the virtues of the Court’s hybrid approach. It
argues that the ex ante arguments the Court adopted to justify the
content regulation here have a strong pedigree in both constitutional law
generally and First Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, doctrinal tests
are only one source of signaling at the Court’s disposal; sometimes
departing from doctrine is the most pragmatic way to accommodate
conflicting values.

I. Information Asymmetries and Rules of the Road
in the Regulation of Lawyers
Understanding the relationship of cooperation, defection, and
agency in private law facilitates understanding of Congress’s efforts to
bar DFTOs’ exploitation of human capital. Cooperation on any level
requires compliance with formal or informal norms that we can call
“rules of the road.” Compliance often hinges on the work of agents, who
49
owe duties of loyalty and confidentiality to their principals. Agents,
48. Id. at 2720–21 (asserting without explanation that teaching international law imparts “specific
skill,” not “general knowledge,” under § 2339A(b)(2) and therefore violates the statutory bar on
“training”).
49. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14N cmt. a (1958) (“[Agents] are fiduciaries; they
owe to the principal . . . loyalty and obedience.”); see also Dubbs v. Stribling & Assocs., 752 N.E.2d
850, 852 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that a real estate broker as agent owes duties of loyalty and obedience to
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including lawyers, can promote cooperation among parties looking to
make a deal. However, agents also can help one party realize unilateral
gains through defection. Either way, the human capital provided by the
50
agent can exceed the value of financial capital. After a brief example of
the use and misuse of agents, this Part discusses how promoting
compliance with rules of the road has driven the regulation of lawyers.
A. The Use and Abuse of Agency: A Private Law Story
Illustrating the value of agency, Ronald Gilson has referred to
lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” who tailor deals to address
51
asymmetries in information between the parties. For example,
purchasers in many sophisticated transactions rely on an opinion drafted
52
by the seller’s counsel on the entity’s legal and financial condition. The
opinion letter leverages the lawyer’s reputation to promote cooperation
53
and mutual trust.
The role of the seller’s agent changes dramatically if the seller, with
or without the agent’s knowledge, plans to defect from this cooperative
framework to achieve a one-sided benefit. A defecting party uses the
agent’s reputation, with or without the agent’s knowledge, to exploit the
purchaser’s information deficit. In the opinion-letter context, for
54
example, the seller might conceal material information from the lawyer,
or induce the lawyer to hide such data from the other party. An agent
who knowingly colludes with the defecting party, or herself is deceived,
does not reduce information asymmetries, but instead compounds them.

a seller); Rivkin v. Century 21 Teran Realty LLC, 887 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (N.Y. 2008); see also N.Y.
Real Prop. Law § 443 (2011) (prescribing a standard form that explains to the seller that the agent has
“duties . . . [including] undivided loyalty, confidentiality, [and] obedience”).
50. See Gary S. Beckker, Human Capital 15 (3d ed. 1993).
51. See Gilson, supra note 30, at 263–67; cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 513
(1994) (noting incentives for lawyers, as “repeat players” in the litigation process, to cooperate, along
with countervailing incentives to prolong disagreements).
52. See Gilson, supra note 30, at 275.
53. See id. at 275–76 (“Because reducing the cost of information necessary to the correct pricing
of the transaction is beneficial to both buyer and seller, determination of the matters to be covered by
the opinion of counsel for seller should be in large measure a cooperative, rather than a competitive,
opportunity.” (footnote omitted)).
54. Legal ethics rules guard against a principal’s deception by authorizing the lawyer to disclose in
certain circumstances information necessary to prevent substantial financial harm to others. See
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2) (2011); see also David McGowan, Why Not Try the
Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct,
92 Calif. L. Rev. 1825, 1848–49 (2004) (discussing the problem of clients who deceive lawyers
regarding transactions with third parties).
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B. Reconciling the Regulation of Lawyers with the Rule of Law
When government seeks to regulate agents to reduce asymmetries
in information, courts have tended to defer to government efforts. This
55
deference drives the commercial speech jurisprudence, including much
56
of the regulation of the legal profession. In contrast, when lawyers
challenge government policies, courts worry that regulation of such
advocacy will compound asymmetries in information between the
57
government and the public. Classifying such litigation as political
58
speech, courts review government regulation more rigorously. Some
cases, however, hint at a hybrid of approaches from the commercial and
political speech contexts. In these hybrid cases, courts extend the
commercial speech rationale to other settings where a speaker has a
special relationship that is likely to engender an information gap. Courts,
however, tailor regulation, demanding a safe harbor for speakers who are
59
free from this taint.
In the regulation of the legal profession, regulation of deceptive
speech serves two purposes. First, it addresses asymmetries in
information between lawyer and client. Second, viewed ex ante,
prohibiting deceptive speech and mandating disclosure resolve
collective-action problems by signaling cooperation on rules of the road
governing specialized forums. Consider Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz,
P.A. v. United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld the provisions

55. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Thomas D.
Morgan, The Vanishing American Lawyer 77 n.21 (2010) (discussing the rationale of Zauderer and
other cases upholding First Amendment protection for lawyer advertising). On the theoretical basis
for regulating marketing to reduce information asymmetries, see Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions, in Essays in Trespassing:
Economics to Politics and Beyond 213, 219 (1981) (noting the importance of transparency when
consumers of information confront difficulties in assessing information’s value or reliability).
56. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 569, 584–87 (1998) (suggesting
that government can limit some speech by lawyers as it regulates speech that government enables
through sponsorship or employment); cf. Wendel, supra note 12, at 373–82 (suggesting that much
regulation of lawyers stems from a concern about transparency in the marketing and functioning of the
legal system, but that the conflict between a lawyer’s roles as an advocate for clients and an officer of
the court complicates a comprehensive theory of lawyers as First Amendment actors).
57. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (finding that restrictions on
federally funded lawyers’ challenges to welfare-reform legislation would “draw lines around [the
program of legal assistance] to exclude from litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds
unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider”).
58. Id. at 543–48 (striking down a bar on funding for legal challenges to welfare restrictions); cf.
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1335, 1337, 1338 n.5 (2010)
(construing the Bankruptcy Code narrowly to prohibit attorney advice that a client incur prefiling debt
with the specific intent to avoid repayment, even where the parties conceded that lower scrutiny
consistent with regulation of commercial speech applied, and noting that broader construction would
not vindicate Congress’ intent and would “seriously undermine the attorney-client relationship”).
59. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (upholding “narrow and
necessary limitations” on the speech of lawyers before and during trials in which they are participating).
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of the Bankruptcy Code that govern the marketing and content of for60
profit legal advice. The statute requires a lawyer who assists clients in
61
filing for bankruptcy to identify her firm as a “debt relief agency” that
62
helps the client obtain such relief through a bankruptcy filing. In
addition, the statute bars a lawyer from advising a client to “incur more
63
debt in contemplation of” bankruptcy.
In upholding the disclosure provisions, the Milavetz Court relied on
the higher deference accorded to regulation of commercial speech, but
also attributed to Congress a concern for the proper functioning of
bankruptcy in the economic system. The Court cast lawyers as Gilson’s
transaction cost engineers, building a floor of goodwill between debtors
and creditors. The provisions at issue promoted mutual understandings
64
on rules of the road, even though each side also has divergent interests.
The disclosure requirements provided some assurance to creditors that
lawyers will not try to obtain more business by painting bankruptcy in an
65
unduly rosy light. Creditors concerned that lawyers are promising
clients pie in the sky results could have responded with measures that
disadvantaged debtors as a group. For example, creditors could have
instructed their own counsel to be unduly obfuscatory in opposing
individual bankruptcy petitions, viewing such tactics as a necessary
substitute for the gatekeeping that a debtor’s lawyer should perform.
Creditors also could have become stingier with credit to compensate for
a higher risk of abuse. These unintended consequences would have
ratcheted up mistrust between debtor and creditor, making each side
worse off.
Similar “rules of the road” concerns drove the Court’s upholding of
the provisions that limited advice on incurring debt. Advising a client to
exploit a pending filing by making purely elective purchases would
66
constitute gaming the system. Such advice would harm the debtor by
67
prompting an adverse ruling in bankruptcy court. However, the Court
narrowed the provision appreciably by reading it to permit advice that a

60. 130 S. Ct. at 1335–39.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2010).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) (2010).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2010). For more on Milavetz, see Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme
Court’s Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 Am.
U. L. Rev. 1499, 1508–12 (2010); see also Knake, supra note 11 at 648–52; Margaret Tarkington, A
First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech 5–9 (Aug. 31, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669617.
64. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1336 (citing Conrad v. Pender, 289 U.S. 472, 478 (1933)) (noting that the payment of
attorney’s fees by a debtor may be scrutinized to prevent a debtor from “deal[ing] too liberally with
his property,” that is, paying more than necessary for legal services to avoid having assets go to
creditors).
67. Id. at 1337.

Margulies_63-HLJ-455 (Do Not Delete)

468

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/24/2012 6:08 PM

[Vol. 63:455

client incur debt “for a valid purpose,” such as a loan for living
68
expenses. The Court suggested that a broader interpretation of the
statute would unduly interfere with the attorney-client relationship and
69
impair bankruptcy relief.
Asymmetries in information and the need for rules of the road
prompt judicial deference, even outside the commercial speech context.
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Court upheld some limits on
lawyers’ use of pretrial publicity, noting that lawyers’ “special access to
70
71
information” heightened the risk of prejudice to the jury pool. The
Court stressed the legal system’s rules of the road, which focus juries on
72
“evidence and argument in open court” and shield the fact finder from
73
information that is privileged or prejudicial. As “key participants in the
criminal justice system,” lawyers have a central role in maintaining those
rules of the road, “and the State may demand some adherence to the
74
precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct.”
Information asymmetries are less salient in a bench trial because a judge
75
is far less susceptible to lawyer manipulation than is a jury.
In the pretrial-publicity setting, some limits also resolve collectiveaction problems. Without a rule, litigation adversaries would engage in a
Hobbesian war of all against all, diminishing courts’ distinctive
76
institutional capital. Moreover, a rule saves the advocate from an
intrapersonal collective-action problem, which pits the lawyer today

68. Id. at 1336.
69. Id. at 1338 n.5 (“[Broader construction] would seriously undermine the attorney-client
relationship.”).
70. 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991).
71. Id. at 1075.
72. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
73. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074–76. For criticism of Gentile as a needless intrusion on political
speech, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First
Amendment, 47 Emory L.J. 859, 867–71 (1998).
74. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (emphasis added); cf. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and
the Law of Speech, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 687, 692–94 (1997) (justifying limits on pretrial publicity as a
necessary incident of regulating advocacy in court).
75. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for the Court in ruling that courts should assess pretrial
publicity under a lower standard of review, regarded permitting public comments in a bench trial as
sufficient to save the limit’s constitutionality, observing that “trial judges often have access to
inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are presumed to be able to discount or disregard
it.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1077 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy and the four Justices who
joined him in striking down the Nevada limit as void for vagueness regarded the exclusion of bench
trials as necessary, but not sufficient, to save the measure. Id. at 1036–38 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
(conceding that some limits on pretrial publicity were appropriate, but asserting that the voir dire
process is often adequate to guard against prejudice).
76. See Patterson, 205 U.S at 462 (“The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached
in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether a private talk or public print.”); cf. Wendel, supra note 12, at 400 (discussing the
rationale for regulating pretrial publicity).
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77

against her future self. In the short term, pretrial doldrums may tempt
78
lawyers to put much of their case before the public. In the longer term,
however, detailed statements on the public record may damage the
client’s prospects by locking the lawyer into a strategy that does not fit
changed circumstances. A lawyer who cannot deliver at trial on public
statements will endure push-back from the jury at her client’s expense.
However, when a trial is pending, the lawyer may not sufficiently
consider that risk. The rule signals to lawyers that they should steer clear
79
of temptation.
Yet another facet of this relational content-regulation model is the
provision of a safe harbor for those outside the relationship that the law
seeks to regulate. In the pretrial-publicity setting, for example, attorneys
not involved in the lawsuit are free to comment on any aspect of the
80
case. This safe harbor has a number of purposes. First, it ensures that
the public will get to hear a wide range of substantive positions, which
will overlap with positions that regulated parties might articulate. The
safe harbor ensures that neither the government nor a private individual
or entity can keep particular positions out of the public square. The safe
harbor also has a healthy ex ante effect on government: If the
government could categorically bar all attorneys from speaking out
regarding possible injustice in a criminal prosecution, it would have a
greater incentive to target those who have posed a substantive challenge
81
to government policies. Allowing independent speech reduces the
government’s incentive.
77. An intrapersonal collective-action problem is one “in which the costs and benefits, for a
particular person, of engaging in an activity change dramatically over time.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 26 (1991); see also Daniel Read, Intertemporal Choice,
in Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making 424, 428–29 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel
Harvey eds., 2004) (arguing that individuals tend to prefer a “smaller-sooner reward”); David Laibson,
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443, 443–45 (1997) (arguing that people
employ “commitment mechanisms” such as insurance policies or savings plans to compensate for the
tendency to unduly discount the future); George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting
Future Utility, 118 Q.J. Econ. 1209, 1209–12 (2003) (analyzing errors in discounting over time);
cf. Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union
Organizing, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 681 (2010) (arguing that undue discounting of long-term gains may
prejudice attempts at unionization, which often involve short-term risk and delayed gains).
78. See Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies in
the War on Terror, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 347, 385–88 (2009) (discussing tactical risks of pretrial publicity).
See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment
One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1259 (2009) (analyzing the
interaction of legal and public relations strategies).
79. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 18–20 (2000) (discussing the importance of
signaling in overcoming information asymmetries and promoting trust).
80. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1062 (1991).
81. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 632 (1959) (“[P]ermissible criticism [of systemic injustice] may
as well be made to a lay audience as to a professional [one].”); see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647
(1985) (finding that a single incident of rudeness in a letter complaining about inadequate
compensation in court-assigned criminal defense cases does not merit suspension from practice). But
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As the importance of safe harbors demonstrates, lawyers also serve
as agents in the cause of constitutionalism itself. Constitutionalism is a
coordinated game premised on the polity’s collective understanding that
82
shortsighted decisions can distort abiding values. Alexander Hamilton
famously remarked that elected officials were often subject to the
83
“effects of occasional ill humors in the society.” These effects could
84
prompt “serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”
Under a constitutional order, majorities agree to limit some short-term
choices, such as measures that could oppress minorities. In return,
majorities receive protection from long-term shifts in the polity that
could limit their rights. Lawyers actualize this bargain, integrating shortand long-term perspectives of parties to public law disputes, just as they
do for private actors. If government seeks a short-term payoff through
85
oppression of minorities, lawyers seek relief in the courts. This role
reduces the influence of short-term perspectives that can impel
defections from the rule of law. Without lawyers performing this role,
86
transaction costs could be far higher, as only popular upheavals could
overturn oppressive legislation. Government change would become a
87
volatile series of “pendular swings” rather than an exercise in

see Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial
Reputation, 97 Geo. L.J. 1567, 1587–1600 (2009) (arguing that courts have impaired public discussion
of the legal system through sanctions against attorneys for allegedly disrespectful extrajudicial
comments); Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 363, 363–71 (2010) (same).
82. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law,
Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1830–35 (2009) (discussing premises of constitutionalism); cf.
supra note 77 (discussing flaws in individuals’ discounting of risks and benefits over time).
83. See The Federalist No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
84. Id. at 469.
85. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–49 (2001) (striking down limits on
government-funded legal representation in challenges to welfare reform); cf. Knake, supra note 11, at
664–72 (discussing the lawyer’s role in challenging violations of constitutional rights); Kathryn A.
Sabbeth, Towards an Understanding of Litigation as Expression: Lessons from Guantanamo, 44 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1487, 1495–1503 (2011) (same). Lawyers arguably serve a similar function within
government agencies by arguing for the observance of constitutional norms. Unfortunately, the Court
has declined to protect this type of lawyer speech, defining it as nonpublic and within government’s
ambit as an employer. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–23 (2006); see also Orly Lobel,
Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev.
433, 451–55 (2009) (critiquing Garcetti as inhibiting dialog and dissent within government agencies).
86. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review 136–38 (2004) (discussing the Federalists’ view of the role of the judiciary); cf. Larry
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 1599–1615
(2005) (reviewing Kramer, supra) (assessing arguments against constitutional interpretation by people
and elected officials); Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular
Originalism, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 827, 831–42 (2011) (discussing the images and rhetoric of
constitutionalism in Tea Party commentary); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 1185, 1204 (explaining that in the Founding Era dispute over the Alien and Sedition Acts,
“constitutional meaning was hammered out informally through political contestation”).
87. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (striking down habeas-stripping provisions
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deliberation and dialogue. Carving out a role for lawyers representing
alleged victims of government overreaching thus fulfills crucial
constitutional purposes.

II. A Perennial Concern: Foreign Agents and American History
Governmental efforts to limit U.S. residents’ agency relationships
with foreign powers have a long history, going back to the enactment of
the Constitution itself. The Framers worried about asymmetries of
information regarding the intentions of foreign powers and signaled
88
America’s desire for comity in the fluid domain of foreign affairs. Our
history since the Founding Era has continued to reflect this concern.
However, efforts by the Framers and their successors to limit foreign
influence have on occasion triggered government aggrandizement and
suppression of independent advocacy. Courts since the Founding Era
have used the avoidance canon to curb government overreaching.
A. Foreign Agents and the Founding Era
Concern about the opacity of foreign influence drove the drafting
and enactment of two constitutional provisions: the residency
requirements for election to the House of Representatives and the
Foreign Gifts Clause. The Framers differed only on the identity of the
foreign power that posed the greatest threat. Jeffersonian Republicans
89
90
cited British plots. Federalists feared France. Each side noted its lack
91
of knowledge of foreign powers’ intentions.
Pushing for a residency clause that would limit the influence of
foreign nationals on the legislative branch, George Mason of Virginia
warned that a “rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might
send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for
92
insidious purposes.” Heeding Mason’s caution, the Framers required
that at the time of election a member of the House of Representatives be
a U.S. citizen for seven years and an “inhabitant” of the state that
93
included his district.
Even more concrete concerns about foreign influence impelled the
94
enactment of the Foreign Gifts Clause. Delegates at the constitutional
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
88. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 393 n.245 (2009)).
89. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 17, at 441–49 (detailing Jeffersonians’ opposition to the
Jay Treaty with Britain, which would have increased Britain’s economic influence).
90. Id. at 360 (discussing Hamilton’s concern about the French Revolution).
91. See infra notes 92–106 and accompanying text.
92. Notes of James Madison (Aug. 8, 1787), in 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
at 216 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (recording Mason’s arguments).
93. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
94. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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convention in Philadelphia and at state ratifying conventions feared that
gratuities from foreign heads of state could sway public officials in this
country. Celebrated episodes fueled this anxiety: The king of France had
given a snuffbox to Arthur Lee and a diamond-studded painting to
95
Benjamin Franklin. Edmund Randolph, soon to become the nation’s
first attorney general, warned that the king’s gifts had
“disturbed . . . confidence” in the alliance between France and the U.S.,
and “diminished . . . mutual friendship, which [helped] carry us” through
96
the Revolutionary War. The Framers hoped that a bar on foreign gifts
would both reduce corruption among American officials and signal that
foreign powers should deal directly and transparently with Congress and
97
the President.
Hamilton defended key structural provisions of the Constitution on
similar grounds. He cast the Treaty Clause as a hedge against foreign
intrigue within the federal government. According to Hamilton, while
“leading individuals in the Senate [could] prostitute[] their influence in
that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption” and bring
to the floor a treaty that injured American interests, two-thirds of the
98
Senate would not follow suit. Hamilton also defended the electoral
college as a safeguard against foreign influence, reasoning that its
temporary operation and shifting membership would frustrate “the
99
desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.”
During the Founding Era, concern about foreign influence often
dovetailed with anxiety that agents of one country would entangle the
new republic in conflicts abroad. President Washington’s Neutrality
Proclamation signaled to warring European nations that the U.S. would
100
not become a party to their conflict. Highly public events made such
signaling necessary. In the most prominent example, Edmond Genet of
France engaged in provocative acts in the course of his service as the
French ambassador to the U.S. For example, Genet outfitted at least one
101
privateer that sailed from American shores to prey on British shipping.
Even Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, a celebrated Francophile and
Anglophobe, recognized the risk presented by Genet’s maneuverings.

95. See Teachout, supra note 88, at 361.
96. David Robertson, Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia 330–31
(Richmond, Enquirer-Press 2d ed. 1805).
97. See id.
98. See The Federalist No. 66, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
99. See The Federalist No. 68, at 412–13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hamilton reasoned that permitting longer membership in a continuing body could facilitate foreign
efforts at corruption. Id. at 413.
100. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential
Power Outside the Courts, in Presidential Power Stories 21, 44 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis
A. Bradley eds., 2009).
101. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs 78–80 (2007).
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Fearing that American inaction in the face of Genet’s provocations
would persuade Britain that the U.S. had joined forces with France,
Jefferson declared that for “[U.S.] citizens . . . to commit murders and
depredations on the members of nations at peace with us . . . [was] as
much against the law of the land, as to murder or rob [other U.S.
102
citizens].”
Jefferson’s foe John Marshall had even more pronounced views on
the need for clear signals to overcome asymmetries in information
between nations. In well-known remarks to Congress made shortly
before his appointment as Chief Justice, Marshall recalled Genet’s
intrigue as a paradigmatic danger to the new republic, which required an
103
unequivocal response. Marshall also recognized that foreign powers
seeking an advantage in conflicts abroad would not merely try to use
America as a base, but would seek to extort money from the U.S. as the
price for peace. Indeed, Marshall knew about this tendency first hand.
His knowledge stemmed from service on the diplomatic mission to
France that culminated in the notorious XYZ Affair, in which French
officials evaded negotiating about trade policy and instead demanded
104
millions in cash as the price for avoiding war. Summarizing the lessons
of the new republic’s first decade under the Constitution, Marshall
warned about the ubiquity of imperfect information about rapidly
changing matters abroad, noting the challenge of “understand[ing]
precisely the state of the political intercourse and connexion between the
105
United States and foreign nations.”
Importantly, Marshall warned that this asymmetry was reciprocal:
foreign powers could be uncertain of the U.S.’s intentions. For Marshall,
clear signaling of a commitment to comity would dispel foreign powers’
mistrust. Counseling judicial deference to President Adams’s decision to
extradite a British subject, Thomas Nash, Marshall recommended
flexibility in the application of American rights such as trial by jury to the
106
shifting transnational sphere.
Marshall also acknowledged asymmetries in information about
foreign affairs while serving as Chief Justice. In a classic early decision,
this acknowledgement spawned the avoidance canon, which narrows the
scope of statutes to avoid conflicts with the overall legal landscape.

102. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (June 17, 1793), in 9 The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, at 131, 136 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) (quoted in 10 Annals of Cong. 599
(1800) (statement of John Marshall)).
103. See 10 Annals of Cong. 598–99 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) (discussing the Genet
episode); see also Powell, supra note 14, at 1511–27 (discussing Marshall’s views).
104. See 2 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 255–64 (1916); see also Elkins &
McKitrick, supra note 17, at 568 (describing the French Directory’s approach to dealing with both the
U.S. and European governments as that of an “international bully”).
105. 10 Annals of Cong. 614–15 (1800).
106. Id. at 611.
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Marshall wrote for the Court in Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, which held that courts should interpret statutes to avoid clashes
107
with international law. Applying the avoidance canon, the Court
narrowly interpreted a statute that limited trade with France in order to
108
reduce the risk of entanglement in foreign conflicts. The statutory text
prohibited Americans from trading with France; the Court declined to
read it as also prohibiting trade with France by subjects of neutral
109
countries, since international law protected the rights of neutrals. By
requiring Congress to state clearly its intent to defy international law, the
Court sought to ensure that Congress would deliberate carefully before
enacting a statute with such a disruptive effect.
The Framers’ efforts to calibrate policy with imperfect information
about foreign powers had a decidedly darker side, entailing the
expression of dissent. Not content with measures that limited trade with
France, the Federalists passed the Sedition Act, which criminalized any
criticism of policy stated with the intent to cast the government “into
110
contempt or disrepute.” This episode illustrated that efforts to address
the problem of imperfect information about foreign powers can suppress
the exercise of democratic voice at home.
Concern about American agents promoting foreign designs
reemerged during the War of 1812. The governor of Massachusetts
publicly disclosed plans for pending military operations against the
111
British. New England residents smuggled livestock across the northern
112
border, forming an integral link in the supply chain for British troops.
107. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”).
108. Id. (ordering a navy commander to pay compensation for improperly seizing a vessel owned
by a national of a neutral power); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479, 482
(1998); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the
Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 293, 302 (2005). See generally Peter Margulies, Judging Terror
in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L.
Rev. 383 (2004) (arguing that courts should interpret statutes authorizing force as being consistent
with international humanitarian law).
109. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.
110. Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596 (1798); see Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 17, at 592–93; Stone,
supra note 20, at 37–38 (describing Federalists’ claims that the Sedition Act was justified because of a
“crowd of spies and inflammatory agents” that was “alienating the affections of our own citizens”);
Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate
Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1525, 1536–51 (2004); Deborah Pearlstein, The
Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold War World, 38 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
547, 566 (2007).
111. See Jan Ellen Lewis, Defining the Nation: 1790 to 1898, in Security v. Liberty: Conflicts
Between Civil Liberties and National Security in American History 117, 133 (Daniel Farber ed.,
2008).
112. Id. Over a generation later, concern about British influence fueled movement for the
annexation of Texas. See David E. Narrett, A Choice of Destiny: Immigration Policy, Slavery, and the
Annexation of Texas, 100 Sw. Hist. Q. 271, 294–95 (1997). During and immediately after the Civil
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While the federal government failed to stop this collusion, the aftermath
of the war saw an increase in national power and a consensus that states
113
could not act as agents for a wartime adversary.
B. Policy and Paranoia: Foreign Agents in the Twentieth Century
Concerns about asymmetries of information in dealings with foreign
powers have continued to animate U.S. policy. Notable incidents of
foreign influence ensured that the concerns received officials’ attention.
As in the early period, one strand of policy targeted the problem directly,
while another strand targeted free expression of ideas. In recent decades,
the courts have used statutory interpretation, including the canon of
constitutional avoidance, to nudge policymakers toward the first option.
American involvement in World War I was spurred by the
Zimmerman telegram, in which German diplomats including the
ambassador to the U.S. proposed that Mexico enter into an alliance
114
against the U.S. During World War II, U.S. citizen Tokyo Rose, acting
on directions from the Japanese government, broadcast propaganda
115
urging American soldiers to abandon the fight. Indeed, Tokyo Rose
was the prototypical agent for a defecting party, since she constructed a
benign image of the Japanese war effort that conveniently concealed
116
wartime atrocities. After World War II, espionage by U.S. citizens
acting on behalf of the Soviet Union ensured the issue’s continued
117
currency.
Policy responses to this issue range from neutral to repressive. Some
responses to this concern have focused largely on regulating foreign
principals’ functional participation in the American economy or political
118
scene. Congress and the executive branch also have had an incidental
War, Secretary of State Seward expressed his anxiety about France’s effort to install the Austrian
Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian as emperor of Mexico, and what that effort might portend for French
interference in American governance. See Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as
Senator and Secretary of State 190 (New York, Derby & Miller 1891).
113. See Lewis, supra note 111, at 133.
114. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National
Security Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233, 253 (2008).
115. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Cf. Michael J. Lebowitz, “Terrorist Speech”: Detained Propagandists and the Issue of
Extraterritorial Application of the First Amendment, 9 First Amend. L. Rev. 573, 596 (2011).
117. See G. Edward White, Alexander Vassiliev & Alger Hiss: Part II, 13 Green Bag 2d 85, 89
(2009) (noting confirmation in Soviet files of the participation of Julius Rosenberg in an espionage
plot, and tracing the Soviet service of American diplomat—and former law clerk for Justice Holmes—
Alger Hiss).
118. For instance, Congress has barred foreign entities and individuals from making direct
contributions to American political campaigns. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2010). See generally Neil J. Mitchell,
Foreign Money and American Politics, 24 Polity 337 (1991) (book review). Legislation also has limited
foreign ownership of media outlets. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (2010); see Ian M. Rose, Barring Foreigners
from Our Airwaves: An Anachronistic Pothole on the Global Information Highway, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
1188, 1188 (1995). In addition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act permits courts to issue
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effect on political speech through measures such as travel bans and
120
disclosure requirements. Officials directly targeted political beliefs
121
122
during World War I and the Cold War.
Judicial assessments of these measures have hinged on the role of
asymmetries in information. If a measure targeted the expression of
ideas, courts declined to grant the government power to shield its policies
123
from public debate. However, courts typically have upheld measures
that left space for public debate and that managed asymmetries in
information between the U.S. and foreign powers.
During the Cold War, courts relied on the avoidance canon to limit
the scope of measures targeting ideas. In Yates v. United States, the Court
construed the Smith Act, which prohibited membership in any
124
organization that advocated the government’s forcible overthrow, as
requiring not merely adherence to abstract Communist party doctrine,
125
but the instigation of specific action. The Court relied on the avoidance
doctrine, denying that Congress would have casually entered the
126
127
“constitutional danger zone” demarcated by the punishment of ideas.
warrants for surveillance of an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802–1803 (2010); see United
States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 1984).
119. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 244 (1984) (upholding a ban on travel to Cuba); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1965) (same).
120. See Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2010)). The Act currently requires foreign nations to disclose their sponsorship of
“informational materials” produced on their behalf. Id. § 614.
121. See William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 375, 389–92.
122. See id.; see also L.A. Powe, Jr., The Role of the Court, in Security v. Liberty, supra note 111,
at 165, 167–70 (asserting that avoidance decisions slowed momentum for Cold War restrictions); Philip
P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 397, 417–26 (2005).
123. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that Congress had not authorized denial
of a passport based on expression of unpopular political ideas).
124. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (construing the Alien Registration Act
of 1940 (the Smith Act), ch. 493, § 3, 54 Stat. 670, 670–71 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(2010))).
125. See 354 U.S. 298, 318–19 (1957); cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1961)
(imposing a heightened standard requiring both “active” membership in a subversive organization and
proof of specific intent to overthrow government through violence).
126. Yates, 354 U.S. at 319.
127. For more on the avoidance doctrine, see Ashwander v. Tennesee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.
288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Frickey, supra note 122, at 417–26 (approving of the use
of the avoidance doctrine in Cold War cases); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1602–13 (2000) (discussing the
rationale for avoidance). But see Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 90–
97 (expressing skepticism about the legitimacy and utility of the doctrine). Yates and its companion
cases paved the way for the Court’s landmark holding in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49
(1969), that the government could punish speech advocating violence only when the speaker wished to
provoke violence and when violence was reasonably likely to occur in the imminent future. See
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Judgment Calls: Principle and Politics in Constitutional
Law 109 (2009) (discussing the Court’s incremental path to Brandenburg).
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Justice Black, who would have gone further and struck down the statute,
stressed that upholding the convictions would have compounded
128
information asymmetries between the government and its constituents.
Justice Black made clear that vacating the convictions deterred
government’s exploitation of prejudice against “obnoxious or
129
unorthodox views” to stifle public debate crucial to democracy.
Courts take a more deferential view when statutes or executive
orders prohibit travel to nations that pursue policies adverse to U.S.
interests. In applying intermediate scrutiny, courts first require that
travel restrictions be across the board, rather than selective efforts to
130
retaliate against an individual’s expression of her beliefs. Once satisfied
that any effect on speech is incidental, courts cite the role of tourism in
131
generating revenue for foreign powers. A hostile foreign power could
leverage those economic benefits to subsidize courses of action that are
132
adverse to American interests. Courts analogize travel curbs to the
trade measures undertaken since the Founding Era, holding that
reducing revenue for hostile foreign powers is an important policy goal
133
that travel bans are adequately tailored to achieve. When a foreign
134
regime has a track record of imprisoning Americans and seeking to
135
topple other foreign governments allied with the U.S., the political
136
branches can cut off this revenue to provide leverage in negotiations.
128. Yates, 354 U.S. at 339 (Black, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 339. Justice Black also warned of the threat to constitutional values when “[g]uilt or
innocence may turn on what Marx or Engels or someone else wrote or advocated as much as a
hundred or more years ago.” Id.
130. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
131. See, e.g., Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4,
12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing tourism as a “critical and much exploited revenue source” for
foreign governments).
132. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (noting Cuba’s support for armed violence and
terrorism and its deployment of troops abroad “in support of objectives inimical to United States
foreign policy interests”).
133. See, e.g., id. at 243; Emergency Coal., 545 F.3d at 12–13; cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 2101–02
(2005) (arguing that Zemel and later cases have extended deference to the political branches in foreign
affairs, outside the realm of the regulation of ideas).
134. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 15.
135. Id. at 14.
136. Emergency Coal., 545 F.3d at 12–13. The case for deference is clearest when Congress and the
President act jointly. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); cf. Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in Presidential
Power Stories, supra note 100, at 233, 273–75 (noting the limits of Youngstown in providing guidance
to lower courts); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, in The Constitution in
Wartime 173–76 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (distinguishing the Court’s holdings in its cases concerning
the treatment of Japanese-Americans during World War II based on the difference between the
powers exercised by the President and whether or not his actions were authorized by Congress). But
see Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 263, 316–24 (2010)
(arguing that the Youngstown framework, because it defers to some degree to the President even
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Travel restrictions reduce the impact of asymmetries in information
between the U.S. and foreign nations in three ways. First, viewed ex ante,
the mere prospect of such a loss in revenue gives foreign powers
weighing hostile moves a reason to maintain moderate policies. Second,
imposing such curbs assures U.S. allies, who otherwise might have reason
to question the U.S.’s intentions or resolve. Third, travel curbs
compensate for the naiveté of some U.S. travelers, whom a hostile
137
foreign regime could use to extract concessions.
Courts also have stressed information asymmetries in upholding
disclosure requirements for informational material, such as films,
138
sponsored by a foreign entity. In Meese v. Keene, the Court upheld a
139
provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, which
required that any agent of a foreign entity notify the Department of
140
Justice of the distribution of “propaganda” on its principal’s behalf.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, asserted that Congress had
enacted the statute to “better enable the public to evaluate the import”

when Congress is silent, creates an incentive for the President to bypass Congress and clandestinely
implement policies such as warrantless surveillance).
137. The Zemel Court noted that under the so-called “Hostage Act,” 22 U.S.C. § 1732, the
President had statutory authority to “use such means, not amounting to acts of war as he may think
necessary and proper” to free American hostages. 381 U.S. at 15. The Court, noting that the Cuban
Missile Crisis had occurred “less than two months” before the filing of the complaint in the case,
deemed it reasonable that the President took prophylactic steps such as a travel ban to reduce the
need to use this authority. Id. at 15–16. Events in another country now subject to travel restrictions
demonstrated the Court’s prescience. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675–77 (1981)
(discussing the Hostage Act’s relevance to presidential authority to settle claims against Iran in
negotiating the end to the hostage crisis).
Parties challenging such travel curbs have argued that the information asymmetry argument cuts
the other way because travel restrictions limit the ability of U.S. citizens to learn about the
consequences of government policies. See, e.g., Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16. Courts have responded that
many legitimate measures have an incidental impact on the flow of information. Id. at 16–17 (citing the
example of rules limiting access to the White House). Moreover, travel curbs typically have included
exemptions for journalists, scholars, and human rights groups who can learn about country conditions
and publicize the results of their findings. See, e.g., Emergency Coal., 545 F.3d at 6–7 (upholding a
modification in the exemption for educational programs).
138. 481 U.S. 465, 467, 482–85 (1987).
139. Ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2010)).
140. 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (repealed 1995); see Keene, 481 U.S. at 467, 467, 482–85. For criticism of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act as inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence, see Burt
Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America’s National Border and the Free Flow of
Ideas, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 719, 735–38 (1985); Zick, The First Amendment in Transborder
Perspective, supra note 6, at 950–53 (asserting that the legislation’s purpose was the inhibition of
political speech). In 1995, without any judicial prodding, Congress amended the statute on functional
grounds by repealing § 611(j) and replacing the term “propaganda,” with the term “informational
materials.” Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-65, § 9, 109 Stat. 691, 699–700 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–614(a) (2010)). These reforms were suggested in order to increase
compliance with the disclosure requirements by those who were reluctant to acknowledge their link to
“propaganda.” See Charles Lawson, Note, Shining the “Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity” on Foreign
Lobbyists? Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1151, 1171 (1996).
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141

of the materials. In that sense, he noted, the requirement dovetailed
with the commitment to transparency behind the Court’s commercial
142
Justice Stevens also used statutory
speech jurisprudence.
interpretation, as the Court had years earlier in Yates, to avoid any
constitutional problems with stigma imposed by the term “propaganda.”
He noted that parties did not have to expressly identify materials as
143
propaganda in the form provided for disclosure, and that Congress had
defined propaganda in “broad, neutral” terms that echoed common
144
Rather than single out allegedly seditious
dictionary definitions.
material, Congress had covered any communication by friend or foe
145
Another definition, such as
designed to influence or persuade.
“material adverse to American interests,” could have triggered
vagueness concerns. But the ample flow of material under the current
146
regime suggested that the duty to disclose had not chilled speech.

III. Regulating the Assets of Terrorist Groups: Information
Asymmetries and the Continuum of Human and Financial Capital
147
148
Terrorist groups like Hamas, the PKK, and the now largely
149
inspire the same concerns about asymmetries in
defunct LTTE
141. Keene, 481 U.S. at 480–81.
142. Id. at 481–82 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976)).
143. Id. at 471.
144. Id. at 477–78 & n.10 (noting the definition of “propaganda” as “doctrines, ideas, arguments,
facts, or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to
further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause” (quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1817 (1981)).
145. See 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (repealed 1995) (“The term ‘political propaganda includes
any . . . communication . . . reasonably adapted to . . . in any . . . way influence a recipient or any
section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or public interests,
policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference
to the foreign policies of the United States . . . .”); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(declining to construe the provision as applying only to “subversive” propaganda); United States v.
Kelly, 51 F. Supp. 362, 363 (D.D.C. 1943) (“[The Foreign Agents Registration Act ] sought to bring
about disclosure of the authorship and source of [material] . . . which appeared in publications and
other media . . . at the instance of, and particularly when pursuant to compensation paid by, foreign
governments, or foreign factions or parties, whether friendly or unfriendly, whether violent or mild.”).
146. Distributors complying with the provision had disclosed foreign sponsorship of a wide range
of films, including a Canadian documentary on acid rain, a movie distributed by the Israeli consulate
on the persecution of Soviet Jewry, a film distributed by the West German consulate critical of the
Berlin Wall, another German-sponsored opus entitled, “Berlin Means Business and More,” and a film
distributed by Japan extolling free trade. See Keene, 481 U.S. at 483 n.17; Block, 793 F.3d at 1312.
Justice Stevens also echoed the commercial speech jurisprudence in noting that distributors were free
to insert additional material with their disclosure, thereby creating “more speech” to counteract any
stigmatizing effect. Keene, 481 U.S. at 481 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
147. See Levitt, supra note 26, at 135.
148. The PKK, also known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, was founded in 1974. To promote an
independent Kurdish state, it has engaged in a long campaign of violence against both civilians and
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information about foreign powers that drove the Framers’ deliberations.
DFTOs use any asset available to them to promote violence, but reject
the accounting principles that would make their activities transparent.
This rejection of transparency is clearest in the case of cash donations to
foreign terrorist groups, which all nine Justices of the Supreme Court
150
The rejection of
agreed in HLP that Congress could prohibit.
accounting principles is also an apt metaphor for DFTOs’ exploitation of
human capital, including agency ties that generate funds and fresh
recruits. Like the worst-case scenario in Part I of an agent’s aid to a
defecting party, DFTOs use agents to exploit asymmetries in
information. For Congress, combating those information asymmetries
through global coordination requires a comprehensive framework,
including § 2339B, which bars a wide range of “material support” to
151
terrorist groups.
To sustain this framework but also to guard against the
government’s curbing of public debate, the HLP Court fashioned a
hybrid approach that blended intermediate and heightened scrutiny with
the avoidance canon. The activities that the plaintiffs told the Supreme
Court they wished to pursue involved not cash but speech, including
assisting DFTOs in negotiation and training DFTOs in the use of
152
international law and of nonviolent techniques. Because these activities
entail speech, the Court recognized that heightened scrutiny was
153
appropriate. However, just as in the attorney speech cases described
above, a common attribute of the activities the plaintiffs sought to
protect was the existence of an agency relationship. Reviewing the
plaintiffs’ claims required a model that bears a surprising resemblance to
the approach the Court has taken in cases involving the regulation of
lawyers. Even as HLP regulated speech related to agency, as the Court

military targets in Turkey. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010);
Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence 286–95
(2007).
149. The LTTE, commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, were a Sri Lanka group that engaged in
suicide attacks and guerilla warfare, ostensibly to gain autonomy for the ethnic Tamil population. The
Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE in 2009 after a bloody campaign that regained territory
controlled by the group but also cost the lives of many Tamil civilians. See Jon Lee Anderson, Death of
the Tiger: Sri Lanka’s Brutal Victory over Its Tamil Insurgents, New Yorker, Jan. 17, 2011, at 41, 47;
see also Phil Williams, Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or
Transformation?, in Countering the Financing of Terrorism 126, 138–39 (Thomas J. Biersteker &
Sue E. Eckert eds., 2008) (detailing the involvement of the LTTE in criminal conduct, including the
heroin trade, human trafficking, gun-running, and extortion).
150. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2741 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that cash contributions are “inherently . . . likely” to facilitate violence, and therefore
Congress has the power to prohibit such contributions).
151. See supra note 25.
152. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2720–21 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 2723–24.
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had done in the pretrial-publicity context, the decision also built a safe
harbor that can accommodate independent advocacy, scholarship,
journalism, human rights monitoring, and legal representation.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion imported some of the conventions
of the intermediate scrutiny model, including a willingness to assess
government justifications from an ex ante perspective. An ex ante point
of view considers how a given measure shapes incentives for future
154
conduct. Viewed ex ante, barring agency relationships with DFTOs
enhances the possibility of cooperation among foreign entities and
between those entities, and the U.S. Courts have sometimes adopted an
155
ex ante perspective to justify other limits on speech and have also done
156
so in decisions expanding speech rights and crafting evidentiary
157
privileges that limit disclosure in court to spur useful activity. An ex
ante approach also dovetails with the lawyer speech cases and with the
approach that courts have traditionally taken to managing asymmetries
of information in foreign affairs.
Mention of the avoidance canon is ironic because HLP’s principal
flaw is an unnecessary display of broad deference to government fact
finding. The decision’s factual predicate—the systemic defection of
terrorist groups—rests securely on independent accounts. The majority
did not need to rely on government assertions. Moreover, the Court’s
deference, viewed ex ante, might encourage the political branches to
overreach. That eventuality highlights the need for the safe harbors that
the decision provides to those challenging government policy.
A. DFTOs’ Poor Accounting: Reinforcing Violence Through
Putatively Nonviolent Activities
Like so many other stories, this one starts with money. DFTOs work
diligently to gather funds for putatively nonviolent purposes, siphon off
those funds into violence, and conceal the funds’ source and destination.

154. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 840 (1988) (noting the premise that, viewed ex ante, patent
protections provide an incentive for greater innovation); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of
Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs,
118 Yale L.J. 2, 32 (2008) (noting the conventional account that judicial review encourages
government officials to take greater care in making decisions, since officials know that judicial review
will reveal any mistakes).
155. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–60 (1982) (upholding more intrusive regulation of
the distribution chain for child pornography as necessary to “dry up” the market).
156. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The
opinion of the court conclusively demonstrates the chilling effect of the . . . libel laws on First
Amendment freedoms . . . .”).
157. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing Federal Rule
of Evidence 407, which excludes evidence of subsequent repairs to promote the “social policy of
encouraging people to take, or least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee’s note)).
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Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in HLP, courts repeatedly found
158
that terrorist groups disdained sound accounting principles. Courts also
realized early in the lengthy history of the HLP litigation that because
cash is fungible, support for putatively nonviolent programs “frees up
159
resources that can be used for terrorist acts.” Because of this link,
Congress found that DFTOs, like state sponsors of terrorism, “are so
tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an
160
organization facilitates that conduct.” A more holistic focus on DFTOs’
poor accounting also highlights the link between DFTOs’ financial and
human capital assets.
1. The Statutory Framework
Section 2339B, passed as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing,
reflected Congress’s view that curbs on the concrete instrumentalities of
violence, such as “explosives,” would be futile without limits on the
161
financial and human capital that facilitate violence. In the Act and

158. See Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1130 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (“[T]errorist organizations can hardly be counted on to keep careful bookkeeping records.”);
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that proof of specific intent to
aid violence is not required for a criminal conviction based on a defendant’s financial contribution to
Hezbollah because “terrorist organizations do not maintain open books” (quoting Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000))), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), remanded to 405
F.3d 1034 (2005). But see Jeroen Gunning, Terrorism, Charities, and Diasporas: Contrasting the
Fundraising Practices of Hamas and al Qaeda Among Muslims in Europe, in Countering the
Financing of Terrorism, supra note 149, at 93, 100–01 (asserting that Hamas has a “reputation for
financial transparency,” due to its efforts to attract charitable contributions for its humanitarian
efforts, while conceding that it may resort to “money laundering and smuggling” in some of its
operations).
159. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom., Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); see also Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d
773, 777 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Reno); Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698
(7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that because of
fungibility, “donation of money could properly be viewed by the government as . . . like the donation
of bombs and ammunition”); Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1130.
160. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7),
110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010)). Financial assistance to
terrorist groups has also become a focus of international concern. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(d), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (requiring states to prohibit anyone within their personal or
territorial jurisdiction from making any funds, resources, or financial services available to persons who
commit terrorist acts or to entities controlled by them); Financial Action Task Force, Fatf IX
Special Recommendations 2 (2008) (noting the importance of international cooperation).
161. The 1996 statute supplemented an earlier provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, that prohibited acting
with specific intent to cause violence to others for the purpose of influencing government policy. See
Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the (Early)
Model Penal Code, 1 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 5, 8–9 (2005) (“Section 2339A . . . targets aid
provided for use in carrying out specific crimes; section 2339B criminalizes the provision of aid to an
organization that engages in terrorist crimes.”). Prosecutors continue to rely heavily on the earlier
provision, particularly in conspiracy cases. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 111–15 (analyzing cases);
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subsequent amendments, Congress prohibited provision of “any
property, tangible or intangible, or service,” including “financial
162
services,” “personnel,” “training,” and “expert advice or assistance.”
163
The statute defines “training” as the teaching of a “specific skill,” and
“expert advice or assistance” as “scientific, technical or other specialized
164
knowledge.” Barring all such benefits dovetails with Congress’s goal to
“interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money” “at any point along the
165
causal chain of terrorism.”
Under the designation process, the Secretary of State determines
there is evidence indicating that particular organizations such as Al
Qaeda, Hamas, or the LTTE have a track record of violence, particularly
166
The government then informs the
violence against innocents.
organization’s representatives, who have an opportunity to review
unclassified evidence and submit material rebutting the government’s
167
assertions. If the government determines that its evidence warrants
designation of the group as a foreign terrorist organization, the group can
appeal to a federal court, which will set aside a designation that is
arbitrary and capricious, not based on substantial evidence, or
168
inconsistent with procedural safeguards.

Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated
Terrorism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 425, 474–86 (2007) (same). See generally Richard B. Zabel & James J.
Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts: 2009
Update and Recent Developments 13–16 (2009) (analyzing recent prosecutions under §§ 2339A and
2339B); David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 1,
84–93 (2011) (providing case studies of successful outcomes in prosecutions under both subsections).
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2010). After earlier litigation in HLP, Congress clarified certain
of these definitions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, § 6603, 118 Stat. 3638, 3762–3764. For example, Congress stated that “personnel” included only
those acting under the DFTO’s direction or control or those providing such direction and control, and
did not include independent actors. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2010).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2). This clarification, and the clarification on “expert advice or
assistance,” infra note 164, also originated with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2010).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3); see Chesney, supra note 25, at 12–18 (discussing the context of the
statute’s enactment).
165. See S. Rep. No. 102-342 at 22 (1992) (setting out the rationale for providing civil remedies for
victims of terrorism in 18 U.S.C. § 2333).
166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2010).
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B); see People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d
220, 229–30 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the process and holding that the government had violated due
process by failing to give the DFTO an opportunity to view unclassified evidence prior to making a
final decision denying its petition to revoke the DFTO designation).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1)–(3); see United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2005)
(upholding the process and barring collateral review of the designation in subsequent criminal cases);
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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2. DFTOs, the Nexus of Violent and Nonviolent Programs, and
Intermediate Scrutiny
Both Congress and courts ruling before the HLP decision
recognized that a comprehensive framework is essential to combatting
DFTOs’ exploitation of ostensibly nonviolent programs to supply
incentives for violence. For example, terrorist groups like Hamas provide
special assistance to families of suicide bombers, “thus making the
169
decision to engage in terrorism more attractive.” Schools and clerics
170
sponsored by terrorist groups help funnel new recruits. Public goods
such as education, health services, and welfare lock in group membership
171
because an individual who exits the group loses access to these goods.
This functional link between nonviolent programs and violent acts
reinforced courts’ application of intermediate scrutiny to uphold
172
Congress’s bar on cash contributions. A measure prevails under
intermediate scrutiny if it is content neutral, furthers an important
173
governmental objective, and is tailored to achieve that goal. According
to courts, a measure that meets these criteria imposes a merely incidental
174
burden on free speech. Curbing cash contributions is content neutral in

169. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom.,
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); see Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief
& Dev., 549 F.3d, 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Hamas’s social welfare activities reinforce its terrorist
activities . . . by providing economic assistance to the families of killed, wounded, and captured Hamas
fighters . . . .”); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that
targeted payments to families of suicide bombers constitute “incentive” to terrorist acts); cf. Gunning,
supra note 158, at 102 (acknowledging payments of $5,000 to families of suicide bombers); Jerrold M.
Post et al., The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern
Terrorists, 15 Terrorism & Pol. Violence 171, 177 (2003) (“Families of terrorists who were wounded,
killed, or captured enjoyed a great deal of economic aid and attention. . . . [F]amilies got a great deal
of material assistance, including the construction of new homes.” (quoting a jailed terrorist)).
170. See Boim, 549 F.3d at 698 (“Hamas’s social welfare activities reinforce its terrorist
activities . . . [by] providing funds for indoctrinating schoolchildren.”); see also Levitt, supra note 26, at
135 (noting links between a Hamas-affiliated cleric preaching violence and an individual inspired by
the cleric to “scout[] potential sites for suicide bombings in Jerusalem”); Post et al., supra note 169, at
183 (reporting that fifty percent of jailed terrorists interviewed by authors cited experience at a
mosque or other religious influence as “central”).
171. See Boim, 549 F.3d at 698 (noting that Hamas’s social service programs “mak[e] it more
costly . . . to defect”); see also Eli Berman & David D. Laitin, Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods:
Testing the Club Model, 92 J. Pub. Econ. 1942, 1952, 1955 (2008); Justin Magouirk, The Nefarious
Helping Hand: Anti-Corruption Campaigns, Social Services Provision, and Terrorism, 20 Terrorism &
Pol. Violence 356, 358 (2008) (discussing Hamas’s provision of social services).
172. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2009)
(upholding broad curbs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act); Emergency Coal.
to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding
regulations on travel to Cuba as imposing a mere incidental burden on free speech); Reno, 205 F.3d at
1136.
173. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (stating the intermediate scrutiny test).
See generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1175
(1996) (discussing the incidental burdens doctrine and offering some caveats).
174. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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that potential donors remain free to praise terrorist activity and criticize
175
the policies of both the U.S. and its allies. The curb on financial support
vindicates a core governmental interest: disrupting the operations of
176
transnational organizations that engage in terrorist activity. Finally,
such curbs are tailored to achieving this goal: Asymmetries in
information benefit foreign terrorist groups, impeding enforcement of
177
direct prohibitions against violence abroad. Because of the difficulty of
enforcing direct prohibitions outside the U.S., curbing financial and other
178
support is necessary to deter future violence.
B. Terrorist Agents and Hybrid Scrutiny
The distinctive challenge in HLP arose because the speech that the
plaintiffs wished to direct at DFTOs typically prompts heightened
scrutiny of government regulation. As Chief Justice Roberts recognized,
under § 2339B the legal status of the plaintiffs’ activity hinged on its
179
content. The statute barred both “training” that provided a “specific
skill” and “expert advice or assistance” that furnished “specialized
180
knowledge” to a DFTO. By definition, such speech differs in content
181
from speech to DFTOs that Congress permitted. On the other hand,
175. See Reno, 205 F.3d at 1133–36. This view poses a tension with campaign finance decisions like
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), which view money as the virtual equivalent of speech.
The most direct way of resolving this tension is to argue that Citizens United is wrong and that
government has a legitimate interest in regulating contributions of both money and broadcast
advertising for the benefit of particular candidates. The more cautious answer is that the nexus
between political speech and spending makes campaign finance an exceptional case. Protection
accorded to contributions to entirely lawful political campaigns should not necessarily cover
contributions to a vast spectrum of commercial and not-for-profit entities, foreign and domestic, where
courts have previously upheld regulation. See Jeff Breinholt, Resolved, or Is It? The First Amendment
and Giving Money to Terrorists, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1273, 1280 (2008).
176. See Reno, 205 F.3d at 1135–36; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 301(6), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010))
(“[S]ome foreign terrorist organizations, acting through affiliated groups or individuals, raise
significant funds within the United States, or use the United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds
raised in other nations . . . .”).
177. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1136.
178. Id. at 1135–36; cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First
Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 313, 331 (2000) (“The United States has
limited ability to enforce anti-terrorist legislation against foreign organizations that are based in
countries with which the United States has amicable relations, and even less ability to enforce it
against organizations that are based in hostile countries.”).
179. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722–24 (2010).
180. Id. at 2723.
181. See id. at 2723–24 (contrasting prohibited training with instruction that merely provides
“general knowledge”); cf. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 443–44 (1996) (arguing that courts use
strict scrutiny of content-based restrictions to ferret out a government motive to suppress ideas);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 191–94
(1983) (discussing the rationale for strict scrutiny of content regulation). The HLP plaintiffs also
argued that the statute was vague as applied because it did not provide adequate guidance on
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the Court reasoned, the statute did not target the expression of ideas, but
182
only certain interactions with a particular listener. By permitting
183
individuals to say “anything they wish on any topic” outside of this
relation to a DFTO, including speech directed at the world in general,
§ 2339B regulated the relationship with the DFTO, rather than ideas per
184
se. The speech activity at issue therefore claimed a place midway
between pure political speech, which triggers virtually absolute
protection, and the regulation of relationships such as agency between
individuals and organizations, which usually elicits judicial deference.
The distinctive and contained site of the speech at issue in HLP thus
required a hybrid form of scrutiny.
1. Curbing DFTOs’ Gaming of Information Asymmetries
Just as in the cases on attorney-client relationships, the Court’s
hybrid model in HLP focused on managing asymmetries in
185
information. The Court recognized that services to a DFTO constitute
186
human capital, a form of material support on a continuum with cash.
Just as money for social services tightens a terrorist group’s hold on its
members, providing services, training, or expert advice to the DFTO
187
furnishes something of value that the DFTO can exploit.
Agents are useful to DFTOs for the same reason they are useful in
ordinary commercial transactions: By creating trust between parties, they
188
reduce the transaction costs that information asymmetries create.
Lawyer-agents engineer parties’ reputations: Writing opinion letters
vouching for a party’s financial health, lawyers leverage their own

distinguishing training involving a “specific skill” from instruction that merely offered general
knowledge. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2720–22. The Court rejected this argument.
Id.; see infra Part IV.A. (analyzing the Court’s definition and suggesting guidance for future cases).
182. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722 (arguing that the statute barred only
advocacy performed in coordination with, or at the direction of, a DFTO).
183. Id. at 2722–23.
184. Id. (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the statute banned “pure political speech”). The amicus
brief on which I served as co-counsel argued that this centrality of relationships, not ideas, called for
intermediate instead of heightened scrutiny. Brief of Amicus Curiae Scholars, Attorneys, and Fomer
Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues in Support of Petitioners at 27–28, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 5070069, at *27–28.
185. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (“[N]ational security and foreign policy
concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where information can
be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess.”).
186. Id. at 2725–26.
187. Id. at 2727 (“Given the purposes, organizational structure, and clandestine nature of foreign
terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that any material support to these organizations will
ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions—regardless of whether such
support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-terrorist activities.” (quoting Declaration
of Kenneth R. McKune, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint App. at 133, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 3877534, at *133 [hereinafter McKune Affidavit])).
188. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
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reputations to burnish the goodwill owed to their clients. However, the
mutually productive course of dealing that the reputation engineer
enables depends on the parties’ following through. A party who uses an
agent to maximize the returns of defection from the agreement
undermines not only that agreement but the prospects for future
agreement, as well.
This nightmare scenario for agreements is the DFTO business
model. DFTOs have a track record that speaks to a pattern of defection
rather than cooperation. This pattern of defection arises from structural
imperatives that deprive terrorist groups of the capacities for
deliberation and reciprocity that characterize most sovereign states.
190
Since terrorist groups must plan in secret, they seal themselves off from
191
moderate voices that might temper their tactics. While states often
have constituencies or institutions that can check the excesses of their
192
leaders, terrorist groups lack this valuable check. Terrorist groups’
insularity also distorts their temporal perspective. Most terrorist groups
are confident that they will ultimately achieve an epic and unconditional
193
victory over their enemies. Groups who define their mission in
religious terms—often counter to mainstream views—perceive violence
194
as a sacred duty. This polarized environment equates pragmatic
compromise with wholesale betrayal. The group dynamics of DFTOs
195
therefore bid up violence.
Moreover, terrorist groups often become prisoners of the
manipulation they practice. An act of violence brings benefits no matter
how an opposing government reacts: Whether officials are intimidated or
overreach, terrorists can claim success. Violent acts further discredit any

189. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
190. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 179–80 (1998).
191. Id. at 178; cf. Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 72–73 (discussing how terrorist groups use
violence as a spoiler to discredit moderates); Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, Sabotaging the
Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence, 56 Int’l Org. 263, 279–89 (2002) [hereinafter Kydd &
Walter, Sabotaging the Peace] (same); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J.
1307, 1318–23 (2003) (observing that secrecy has a polarizing effect on criminal conspiracies).
192. Judicial review, for example, tames the “undivided, uncontrolled power” that otherwise
distorts governance. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008); cf. Jack Goldsmith, The
Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 206–07 (2007) (arguing
that the Bush administration’s unilateralism diminished support in other branches for its policies,
whereas greater consultation up front would have tempered policies and heightened support). Because
terrorist groups lack the “return address” that makes nations accountable in a global order, these
groups also lack the constraint furnished by international law. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note
82, at 1826–28, 1835 (discussing the role of international law).
193. See Hoffman, supra note 190, at 169 (“[T]errorists . . . live in the future . . . for that distant—
yet imperceptibly close—point in time when they will assuredly triumph over their enemies and attain
the ultimate realization of their political destiny.”).
194. Id. at 168–69.
195. Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 76–77. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes:
How Like Minds Unite and Divide (2009) (discussing the dynamics of polarization).
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moderates within terrorist ranks: If a government overreaches,
196
extremists can say, “I told you so.” If the government draws back,
extremists can argue that substantive concessions on their part are
197
unnecessary, since the group is already winning. Even when a state
retaliates, terrorist groups often can readily move their operatives and
198
evade capture. In an age of social networking across borders, terrorists’
relative freedom from a fixed location yields additional tactical
advantages. This internalized “heads I win, tails you lose” syndrome casts
violence as a winning strategy and blinds terrorist groups to more abiding
199
trends that can render violence dysfunctional, even on its own terms.
While some members of terrorist groups may see past these blinders and
strive for a transition from violence, the obstacles to this clarity of vision
are formidable.
Like any other habitually defecting party, a DFTO needs agents to
fully exploit the information asymmetries in its favor. An unvarying
campaign of terrorist violence can jeopardize the DFTO’s success by
200
spurring equally persistent governmental efforts to eradicate it. To earn
a respite from these efforts, DFTOs therefore have an incentive to
201
occasionally promote themselves as reliable partners. Like other
chronic defectors, however, the DFTO has a problem: It can maximize
the returns from defection only by persuading another party of its
goodwill. A defecting party like a DFTO can solve this problem by

196. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 69–70.
197. Id. at 62–63; Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism,
38 Crime & Just. 413, 422 (2009) (discussing incentives for heightened violence in terrorist groups).
198. See Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 697, 731 (2010) (noting terrorist groups’ advantages in evading
targeting and capture); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 641, 661 (2010)
(same).
199. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 190, at 170 (noting that most terrorist groups disappear within a
decade).
200. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 68 (discussing effective state responses to the terrorist
strategy of intimidation).
201. See C. Maria Keet, Towards a Resolution of Terrorism Using Game Theory 16–17 (2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.meteck.org/TERRORISM_WP.pdf; see also id. at
27 (discussing terrorist groups’ defection). Of course, governments opposing terrorism can defect as
well. Regimes targeted by terrorist groups should not get a pass on their own policies. Indeed, while
pushing for reform of such regimes will not eliminate terrorism, often it will encourage moderate
alternatives to terrorist groups. A failure to reform may only boost terrorist groups’ pretensions to
legitimacy. See Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 Me. L.
Rev. 131, 155–56 (2010) (asserting that the United Kingdom’s former policy in Northern Ireland of
authorizing detention without trial led to radicalization of the Catholic community and increased
violence as the IRA used the policy “as an effective recruiting tool”); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, The
International Standardization of National Security Law, 4 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 437, 450–51
(2010) (arguing that international restrictions on terrorist financing, such as Security Council
Resolution 1373, undermine rights because enforcement of the restrictions and respect for
fundamental rights vary widely between countries).
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employing agents who engender the goodwill that the DFTO’s past
conduct has dissipated. Two kinds of agents work best: those who
approve of the group’s violent aims but are skillful enough to conceal
their approval, and those who do not approve of violence per se but are
willing to overlook or rationalize it, through arguments that the violence
is only a small part of the activity of an otherwise benign group, that the
group is gradually weaning itself from violence, or that the other side is
even worse. In any event, these agents compound the information
asymmetries between the parties, giving the DFTO more benefits upon
202
its defection.
Consider the ostensibly benevolent art of negotiation, in which the
203
HLP plaintiffs wished to train or assist DFTOs like the PKK. The
Court held that Congress could bar agents of the DFTO from engaging
204
in such activity. In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts observed that the
PKK and other DFTOs could “pursue peaceful negotiation as a means of
buying time to recover from short-term setbacks, lulling opponents into
205
complacency, and ultimately preparing for renewed attacks.” Justice
Breyer, in his dissent, dismissed such arguments as “general and

202. Because each of the levels of scienter mentioned in the text compound information
asymmetries, the agent’s knowledge that the group is a DFTO is sufficient to support liability. Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010). The plaintiffs argued that for speechrelated activities, the government should be required to show specific intent to further violence. Id.
However, this requirement is not constitutionally necessary and also makes a poor fit with the
comprehensive framework that Congress enacted. In the domestic sphere, criminalizing help to an
organization would require a showing of specific intent to aid the group’s illegal conduct. See Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1961). However, the government does not face the same
information asymmetries in directly regulating the illegal conduct of domestic groups. See Neuman,
supra note 178, at 331. Therefore, no public interest counsels against a higher scienter requirement for
criminalizing aid to domestic organizations. Cf. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2730
(disclaiming any suggestion that Congress could extend comparable prohibitions to domestic groups);
Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1010 n.150 (viewing this disclaimer as preserving free speech and
association). Moreover, even in the domestic sphere, professional regulation does not require a
showing of specific intent. In the pretrial-publicity context, for example, a lawyer who makes public
comments that pose a substantial likelihood of material prejudice can be sanctioned even when she
does not intend specifically to prejudice the outcome. See Wendel, supra note 12, at 400. The key
factors here, as in the material support of DFTOs, are information asymmetries and the need for rules
of the road in a specialized system.
A specific-intent requirement would also undermine Congress’s comprehensive scheme.
Congress expressly set the scienter level at knowledge of a DFTO’s designation or record of violence.
See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2717 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2010)).
Requiring specific intent for speech-related activities would make the statute a patchwork quilt, since
the plaintiffs acknowledged that specific intent was not required for charges based on the provision of
ammunition, communications equipment, and other tangible items. Id. at 2718. Requiring disparate
scienter levels for violations of the same statutory section would impede enforcement and actually
offer less guidance to parties who wished to conform their conduct.
203. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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206

speculative.” However, independent sources amply document DFTOs’
consistent recourse to this strategy.
Journalists and scholars have noted that DFTOs such as the PKK,
Hamas, and Hezbollah regularly use truces and negotiation to prepare
for renewed violence. The PKK, for example, has used truces not as
207
preludes to peace, but as expedient punctuations to violent campaigns.
Hezbollah has used the respite gained from the end of Israel’s offensive
208
against it in Lebanon to rebuild its storehouse of offensive weapons. In
Sri Lanka, the LTTE undermined a truce by assassinating a prominent
moderate official and obstructing a reservoir that provided water to
209
thousands of farmers.
DFTOs’ leveraging of information asymmetries encourages such
manipulation. Only a DFTO knows when the organization will deem it
expedient to terminate a truce and resume the targeting of civilians. That
uncertainty is a tactical benefit that negotiators for a DFTO enhance,
whether or not the negotiators specifically intend to facilitate terrorist
acts. The First Amendment should not bar Congress from prohibiting
training that merely adjusts the spigot of violence.
Similarly, while the HLP plaintiffs wished to train DFTOs in “the
210
use of international law,” evidence suggests that DFTOs already
manipulate this knowledge for strategic purposes. Consider the analysis
of the Gaza police force in the United Nations-sponsored Goldstone
Report, which examined human rights in Israel and the occupied
territories during and immediately after Israel’s military intervention in
211
Gaza in 2008–2009. The report, which obtained most of its information
206. Id. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 265 (arguing that
the HLP majority’s account of DFTOs’ manipulation of international law and organizations was
“conclusory,” “of dubious probability,” and “insufficient to satisfy heightened scrutiny”).
207. See Marcus, supra note 148, at 286–95; see also Catherine Collins, Kurd Violence Rises in
Turkey, Raising Fears of a Renewed War, Chi. Trib., May 18, 2005, at 6 (discussing the return to
violence by groups associated with the PKK after the end of a truce); Ayla Jean Yackley, 20 Injured in
Turkish Resort Bomb, Irish Times, July 11, 2005, (World) at 11 (reporting the explosion of a bomb for
which the militant wing of the PKK claimed responsibility, which injured twenty people, including at
least one critically, and which came after a unilateral truce declared by the PKK).
208. See Michael R. Gordon & Andrew W. Lehren, Straining to Stop Arms Flow: U.S. Officials
Frustrated in Blocking Weapons from Reaching Militants, Int’l Herald Trib., Dec. 7, 2010, at 7
(noting that Hezbollah, a DFTO based in Lebanon, has an arms inventory that includes “50,000
rockets and missiles, including some 40 to 50 Fatah-110 missiles capable of reaching Tel Aviv and most
of Israel, and 10 Scud-D missiles”); cf. Ian Black, US Used Israel Intelligence to Block Arms from Iran
and Syria, Guardian (London), Dec. 7, 2010, at 6 (detailing U.S. efforts to halt arms shipments to
both Hamas and Hezbollah). Hezbollah, a Shiite group that precipitated an armed conflict with Israel
in 2006, allegedly has also used narcotics trafficking and money laundering for strategic purposes. See
Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2011, at A1.
209. See Anderson, supra note 149, at 47.
210. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24 (majority opinion).
211. See Rep. of U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48
(Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report]; cf. Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the
Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 279, 292–95 (2011)
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from tours of Gaza supervised by Hamas, classified air strikes on Gaza
police stations as disproportionate measures under the law of war, even
though the report’s drafters acknowledged that “a great number of the
Gaza policemen were recruited among Hamas supporters or members of
212
Palestinian armed groups.” In fact, a veteran member of Al Qassam,
Hamas’s military wing, stated to a journalist that “two-thirds of Hamas
213
policemen are police by day and Al Qassam by night.” This lopsided
ratio demonstrates that the Goldstone investigators were unduly
credulous in accepting Hamas’s claim that “the Gaza police were a
214
civilian law-enforcement agency.” The heavy percentage of Hamasaffiliated individuals suggests that the remainder served as human shields
in a sophisticated, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to immunize
strategic targets from attack.
Information asymmetries made the Hamas wager worthwhile. While
215
human shields violate international law, a government force opposing
the DFTO must prove the elusive proposition that a targeted site
contained combatants. DFTOs can readily move personnel and mortars
to frustrate this effort. In contrast, one photograph proves that an
opposing government force attacked the structure’s site. Viewed ex ante,
inquests like the Goldstone Report give a DFTO two chances to succeed:
A government force will either forego a legitimate target or follow
216
through and risk global discredit. The plaintiffs in HLP, whatever their
intent, wished to provide training that would have aided DFTOs’

(critiquing the Goldstone Report).
212. See Goldstone Report, supra note 211, ¶ 34. Some Israeli actions during the Gaza campaign
were violations of the law of war. See Isabel Kershner, Israel Rebukes 2 in Attack on U.N. Complex,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2010, at A4 (discussing Israeli reprimands of senior officers who had directed the
firing of artillery that hit a United Nations compound in Gaza).
213. See Kristen Chick, In Gaza, Rise of Hamas Military Wing Complicates Reconciliation with
Fatah, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 4, 2010, at 14; cf. Hamas Asserts Role in Suicide Bombing, Wash.
Post., Feb. 6, 2008, at A14 (detailing assertions by Gaza officials that an Israeli attack on a police
station in retaliation for a suicide bombing killed police officers and Al Qassam members).
214. See Goldstone Report, supra note 211, ¶ 34.
215. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 28,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (“The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain
points or areas immune from military operations.”); Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court,
art. 8, § 2(b)(xxiii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other
protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations
[constitutes a war crime.]”); see also Eyal Benvinisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare
Enemy Civilians, 39 Isr. L. Rev. 81, 104 (2006) (analyzing international humanitarian law provisions);
Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a
War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 445, 455 (2002) (same).
Hezbollah also has used human shields. See Greg Myre, Offering Video, Israel Answers Critics on War,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2006, at A1 (describing evidence of Hezbollah rocket placements in population
centers).
216. See LaFree & Dugan, supra note 197, at 422 (“A particular terrorist group may gain utility
from political instability . . . . [that] results either if the government appears ineffective in curbing
[terrorist] acts or if the government overreacts and appears repressive and brutal.”).
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exploitation of such asymmetries in information. The U.S. has a
compelling interest in thwarting DFTOs’ “heads I win, tails you lose”
strategy.
The manipulation of international humanitarian law that bore fruit
in the Goldstone Report is hardly an isolated example. In his HLP
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts observed that DFTOs had effectively
taken over administration of refugee camps from the United Nations,
218
exploiting the camps’ protected status to prepare for additional attacks.
The PLO used a United Nations training center during the Israeli
219
Terrorist groups also have
invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s.
successfully lobbied for additions to the Geneva Convention that allow
them to operate with impunity. By supplanting the traditional
international humanitarian law requirements that combatants wear
220
uniforms, observe a fixed command structure, and display arms openly,
Geneva’s Additional Protocol I impedes governmental compliance with
221
the duty to avoid harm to innocents. In addition, new guidelines from
the International Committee of the Red Cross recommend protection for
222
individuals who provide substantial support to violence. The guidelines,

217. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729 (2010).
218. Id. at 2729–30 (“[T]he United Nations . . . was forced to close a Kurdish refugee camp in
northern Iraq because the camp had come under the control of the PKK and the PKK had ‘failed to
respect the camp’s neutral and humanitarian nature.’” (quoting McKune Affidavit, supra note 187, at
135–36) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Rony Brauman, Darfur: The International Criminal
Court Is Wrong, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Sept. 2010), http://www.msf-crash.org/drive/8230-rb2010-darfur-the-icc-is-wrong-(uk-p4).pdf (“[Darfur refugee] camps were also—as is always the case—a
refuge for the rebel movements, which gained influence and resources.”).
219. See Jack I. Garvey, Rethinking Refugee Aid: A Path for Middle East Peace, 20 Tex. Int’l L.J.
247, 252 (1985) (asserting that this was an isolated occurrence, while acknowledging more generally
that the availability of United Nations aid removed the incentive to temper extremist demands). The
PLO, or Palestine Liberation Organization, engaged in terrorist attacks in Israel and Europe for
decades; after negotiations with Israel in 1993 and the 1994 signing of a joint Declaration of Principles
at the White House, its leadership assumed control of the newly created Palestinian Authority, which
at that time was assigned partial responsibility for administration of the West Bank and Gaza. See
Amos N. Guiora, Negotiating Implementation of a Peace Agreement: Lessons Learned from Five Years
at the Negotiating Table, 11 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 411, 414 (2010).
220. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, ¶ 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(conferring lawful combatant status on those who commit violence in the course of “fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes”). For discussion of the enactment
of this provision, see Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United
Against Terrorism, 45 Tex. Int’l L.J. 323, 344–47 (2009).
221. See Blank, supra note 211, at 290 (noting that if government forces believe that apparent
civilians may attack them, those forces will be “more likely to view those who appear to be civilians as
dangerous and respond accordingly”).
222. See Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 53–54 (2009)
(asserting that one who assembles an improvised explosive device (“IED”), like a civilian working at a
munitions factory, does not cause direct harm and would not be considered a direct participant).
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223

which many participating experts opposed, would limit the ability of
government forces to target a trucker knowingly transporting explosives
224
for a terrorist group. The prospect of such manipulation should not bar
U.S. citizens or residents from participation in drafting international
guidelines as independent scholars or representatives of humanitarian
organizations. However, participants who act as agents for a DFTO lend
terrorist organizations an unfair advantage that the Constitution does not
225
require.
2. Regulating Incentives to Promote Cooperation
Minimizing a DFTO’s exploitation of information asymmetries also
yields a renewed chance for cooperation among national and international
actors. In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts rightly identified this ex ante
perspective as crucial, noting the importance of “‘international
226
The
cooperation . . . for an effective response to terrorism.’”
comprehensive framework enacted by Congress creates incentives for
deliberation and reciprocity by both foreign organizations and the
227
governments they oppose. The ability to form relationships with U.S.
citizens, residents, and groups is an inducement tendered to groups
willing to forego the use of violence. Such groups have an opportunity to
differentiate themselves from extremists and identify themselves as
organizations that can reach out both to governments they oppose and to
the international community.
In such a framework, pragmatic moderation can also become selfreinforcing. This happens in two sequences. First, pragmatists among
officials within the government the DFTO opposes can cite the

223. Id. at 9 (advising that the International Committee’s guidance does not necessarily reflect the
views of all or even a majority of the experts who were consulted); id. at 53 n.123 (noting specific
disagreement among experts regarding whether non-state actors who produce IEDs would be
considered direct participants).
224. Id. at 53 (listing transportation of weapons and equipment as an example of indirect
participation). For criticism of this approach, see Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare?
Defender Duties Under International Law, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. 425, 431–37 (2011) (arguing that viewed
ex ante, unduly rigid restraints on governments defending civilians from terrorist groups enhance
incentives for terrorists to plan attacks and conceal themselves within civilian populations); Michael N.
Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 292, 315–22
(2009) (discussing the author’s experience as a participant in the International Committee of the Red
Cross project, and arguing that civilians who voluntarily collude with terrorist groups in an effort to
shield them can be targeted under the law of war as direct participants in hostilities, but that civilians
coerced into service are entitled to protection).
225. See infra notes 257–67 and accompanying text (providing a narrow definition of
“coordination” that provides ample room for legitimate, independent activity).
226. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (quoting the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(5), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010))).
227. Cf. Kydd & Walter, Sabotaging the Peace, supra note 191, at 278–89 (arguing that terrorist
groups such as Hamas use extremist violence to undermine dialogue).
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organization’s peaceful methods as a basis for reciprocal moves by the
government. Cultivating habits of nonviolence gives moderates within
228
the government more credibility and discredits hawks. Second, once
moderate opposition groups extract concessions through a persistent
resort to peaceful methods, groups elsewhere see the virtues of such
229
methods and follow suit. Reciprocity of this kind builds habits of
deliberation that promote peace.
In addition to providing ex ante incentives for coordination between
foreign governments and dissident groups, the statute also frames rules
of the road between those governments and the U.S. As John Marshall
recognized more than two centuries ago, other countries may regard us
230
with a wariness that echoes our perception of an uncertain world. The
U.S. has long cultivated alliances to protect its own national interests.
Offering reciprocal protection to our allies gives them an incentive to
231
deter groups that target the U.S. Since the U.S. has allies in sensitive
regions of the world, pursuing effective counterterrorism policy through
criminal law can reduce the risk that allies will seek American military
232
intervention to cope with terrorist violence. Moreover, reciprocity can
gain the U.S. more leverage in persuading obdurate allies to respect
233
human rights. In addition, an effective criminal counterterrorism policy
will diminish the need for other measures that complicate the U.S.’s
international standing, including detention of suspected terrorists under
234
the laws of war and military commissions. While ex ante arguments

228. This development reverses the cycle of violence described by commentators. Cf. Kydd &
Walter, supra note 29, at 69–70 (describing a cycle in which terrorist attacks provoke government
responses that radicalize moderates who previously opposed terrorist methods).
229. Cf. Jane Stromseth, Post-Conflict Rule of Law Building: The Need for a Multi-Layered,
Synergistic Approach, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1443, 1465–66 (2008) (discussing “demonstration
effects” yielded by efforts to promote the rule of law in sites of mass atrocities such as Sierra Leone).
230. See 10 Annals of Cong. 614–15 (1800).
231. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726–27 (2010) (discussing the
importance of persuading allies such as Turkey, which has long sought to stop violence by the PKK,
that the U.S. shares their concerns); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 1984)
(analyzing the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorize surveillance upon
a finding by a court that the target of surveillance is an agent for a foreign group seeking to “carry out
raids against other nations”).
232. Cf. Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the
International Law of Self-Defense, 29 Mich. J. Int’l L. 127, 131 (2008) (discussing Hezbollah’s 1983
attack on U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, after President Reagan sent Marines as a peacekeeping force).
233. See, e.g., Peter Nicholas et al., Unrest in Egypt: A Rebuffed U.S. Turns to Egypt’s Army in the
Crisis, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 2011, at A1 (noting contacts between Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Egyptian military to ensure a peaceful response to the protests that
ultimately brought down the Mubarak regime).
234. See generally Benjamin Wittes, Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After
Guantanamo (2010) (favoring more straightforward acknowledgment and codification of detention
policy); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military
Detention Models, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1079 (2008) (discussing parallels and differences between models
of adjudication); Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy
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would not suffice to justify the suppression of ideas, managing information
asymmetries and developing rules of the road are ample bases here, as in
235
the pretrial-publicity context, for regulating agency relationships.
3. Flaws in the Court’s Hybrid Approach
However, the HLP Court’s approach to hybrid scrutiny has two
significant flaws, each of which could have been avoided. The first flaw is
largely linguistic: Chief Justice Roberts’s language invited confusion
about the First Amendment status of lending “legitimacy” to violence.
The second flaw is methodological: The opinion heralded a sweeping
deference to the government’s assertions about the harm caused by
agency relationships with DFTOs. Although neither flaw is fatal to the
opinion, each caused mixed signals that distracted from the Court’s
pragmatic goals.
The linguistic flaw arose because Chief Justice Roberts did not
adequately distinguish between functional and ideational senses of
lending “legitimacy” to DFTOs. Most of the opinion used the term in a
functional sense, asserting that material support “lend[s] legitimacy to
foreign terrorist groups . . . that makes it easier for these groups
236
to . . . recruit members, and to raise funds.” Chief Justice Roberts’s
functional argument fits the age-old logic of agency. Consider the
example of an author who wants to secure a book contract. The author
has a choice: She could either have an independent person post a review
of her manuscript on a literary website, or she could retain an agent who
would confer with her and then approach publishers with whom the
agent had a prior course of dealing. Surely most, if not all, authors would
choose option B, because of the benefits offered by an experienced
person who can integrate the author’s wishes and strengths into a
marketing pitch. So it is with a DFTO, which also appreciates the benefit
of a relationship with an individual whose activities the DFTO directs,
controls, or coordinates. Distinguished officials, such as members of
Congress, spend a great deal of their time raising money; terrorist groups
237
pursue this purpose no less avidly. Like political candidates, terrorist
groups prefer to work with those whose activities they can control. An

and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 87 (2008)
(arguing for the creation of a national security tribunal to promote legitimacy); Matthew C. Waxman,
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 Colum. L.
Rev. 1365 (2008) (offering criteria and procedures for detention); Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 161
(analyzing the effectiveness of federal courts in handling terrorism cases).
235. Regulating relationships in this fashion requires safe harbors for protected expression, which I
address in Part IV.
236. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010).
237. See Williams, supra note 149, at 138–39 (discussing the fundraising activities of the LTTE,
including drug and human trafficking, extortion, and credit-card fraud).
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agent who allows the DFTO to maximize the rewards of defection
certainly fits within this rubric.
However, Chief Justice Roberts’s language also could be read to
suggest the ideational sense of lending legitimacy, as in the argument of
any speaker that a DFTO was a worthy group that had been vilified or
misunderstood. Justice Breyer’s dissent was absolutely correct that this
238
justification for regulation lacks a “natural stopping place.” This latter
sense does not fit the logic of the decision, which exempted such
239
independent advocacy. However, use of the term “legitimacy” invited
uncertainty about the decision’s scope and consequences. Since the term
played no functional role in the Court’s analysis, Chief Justice Roberts
easily could have eschewed its use and simply explained in practical
terms how agents, whatever their intent, can help a DFTO reap rewards
from defection. The opinion’s use of the term was a self-inflicted wound
of the kind that a court should avoid, particularly in a decision whose
holding predictably will arouse controversy.
The more serious flaw is a methodological one: the opinion displays
a deference to the government’s claims that is both unnecessary to the
decision and inconsistent with the heightened scrutiny that the Court
adopts. Heightened scrutiny probes the government’s rationale and the
fit between that rationale and the means the government has chosen.
This usually requires some independent confirmation of the
government’s views—otherwise the government becomes the judge of its
own case. However, the opinion relies principally on a government
240
affidavit filed over ten years before the Court’s decision and cites only
241
three independent sources. This is a thin predicate for limiting speech,
even in the discrete form authorized by the Court’s opinion. While courts
vary widely in the support they provide for empirical propositions, the

238. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 2721 (majority opinion) (ruling that the statute “does not cover independent advocacy”).
240. See id. at 2725–30 (majority opinion) (citing McKune Affidavit, supra note 187, at 135).
McKune submitted his affidavit in 1998. While the Court takes the record as it finds it, the passage of
time suggests the wisdom of citing more up-to-date sources from the vast social science literature on
terrorism. See, e.g., Kydd & Walter, supra note 29 (discussing strategies terrorists employ).
241. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725 (citing Levitt, supra note 26, at 2–3); id. at 2726
(citing Brief for Anti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 19–29, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 4074856); id. at 2729 (citing
Marcus, supra note 148). This list is even more sparse than an initial impression might suggest. While
amicus briefs are helpful to the Court, an amicus brief supporting the government may lack the
independence or reliability of scholarly work. Similarly, while Levitt’s book on Hamas is useful, Levitt
had formerly served as a Treasury Department official regulating the financial dealings of DFTOs. See
Steven Erlanger, Militant Zeal: A Terrorism Expert Analyzes the Palestinian Group Hamas, and What
Should Be Done About It, N.Y. Times Book Rev., June 25, 2006, at 10 (reviewing Levitt, supra note
26). For more on deference and fact finding, see Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference,
95 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1404–19 (2009) (arguing for a more nuanced deference that considers both
institutional competence and whether the government utilized competence in a particular case).
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Court offered more support in HLP’s closest analog, the pretrial242
publicity context. Despite the safe harbors that HLP provided, the
decision’s studied paucity of support for the government’s arguments
may prompt legislation even closer to the constitutional line.
The deference heralded in the opinion is also troubling because it
counters a prudential judging rule that Chief Justice Roberts had earlier
practiced: the norm that a court should generally decide cases on the
243
narrowest grounds possible. To be sure, this prudential norm cannot
govern every situation. However, by following it the Court can minimize
the externalities that flow from its decisions and can stick as close to the
facts of disputes as possible. That connection with the facts underlying a
dispute is the courts’ distinctive advantage over the more free-wheeling
deliberations of the other branches. Reaching out to decide an issue
truncates debate that could enrich the Court’s perspective. Here, ample
independent authority supported the government’s view that assistance
in negotiation or training in international law would heighten the
244
information asymmetries that already favor DFTOs. The Court’s
failure to mine this authority undermined the perceived legitimacy of the
decision, obscuring its essential architecture as a blend of discrete
regulation and capacious safe harbors. It is to that second feature of the
decision that we now turn.

IV. Providing Safe Harbors for Challenging Government
While limits on agency relationships with DFTOs reduce
asymmetries of information in foreign affairs, restrictions that sweep too
broadly have an opposite but equally pernicious effect: they increase
asymmetries of information at home. Sweeping restrictions limit the
information available to the public and the ability to challenge
government policies. HLP addressed these concerns through statutory
interpretation that echoed the Cold War Court’s use of the avoidance
canon. The decision constructed a safe harbor by reading the statute
narrowly to protect independent advocacy, scholarship, journalism,

242. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356–62 (1966) (citing a wide spectrum of support,
including newspaper editorials, University of Missouri publications, and the Warren Commission).
243. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied.’” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm’rs of
Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))); cf. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512–
13 (2009) (holding, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that because an electoral district did not
pursue a statutory option to “bail out” of the preclearance requirement of section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, the Court did not have to decide whether the pre-clearance requirement was
constitutional). But see Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917–21 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (arguing that comprehensive overruling of precedent was necessary in a campaign-finance
case, since a narrow holding would not remedy the problem).
244. See supra notes 190–209 and accompanying text.
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human rights monitoring, and legal representation. However, the Court’s
work was marred by conclusory treatment of the plaintiffs’ vagueness
claims.
Just as the Court had invoked the avoidance canon in the 1950s to
temper Cold War statutes that suppressed political ideas, Chief Justice
Roberts read § 2339B to allow speech-related activity that did not stem
245
from an agency relationship with the DFTO. After the Court’s decision
in Brandenburg, the protection of independent advocacy has been at the
core of free speech. To assert her voice, each individual can stand up on
an actual or virtual soapbox and proclaim her views to an attentive (or
indifferent) audience. Of course, in a nation where some can afford more
246
access to a megaphone, the individual’s voice may not prevail. But the
Court’s interpretation of § 2339B left unchanged an individual’s right to
opine on a DFTO such as Hamas, the PKK, or the LTTE: Any speaker is
free to assert that each or every group was benevolent, nonviolent, or not
violent enough.
However, the Court’s decision left questions about speech that
neither emerges from an agency relationship nor is wholly independent
in the “soapbox” sense. Scholars, journalists, and human rights groups
were troubled that Chief Justice Roberts declined to specify how much
247
“coordination” with a DFTO would yield a violation of the statute.
Each of these actors may engage in some contact with a DFTO. For
example, a scholar who studies a DFTO may wish to interview DFTO
leaders to provide focus and detail for her account. A journalist may wish
to do the same in the course of reporting on the DFTO’s activities, as will
a human rights group investigating abuses committed by governments
and non-state actors. If any contact renders such activity “coordinated”
with the DFTO under the statute, many organizations will face
248
substantial legal exposure.
The Court’s initial response to these concerns was inauspicious. The
opinion substituted conclusions for analysis in asserting that the statutory
terms “training” and “expert advice” were not vague as applied. The
plaintiffs had argued that these terms provided insufficient guidance

245. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721–22 (2010).
246. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that a
prohibition on independent political expenditures could be justified by the government’s interest in
“equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections”).
247. See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, Beyond Humanitarian Law Project: Promoting Human Rights in a
Post-911 World, 34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 519, 533–34 (2011) (discussing concerns of journalists
and other groups); Scott Atran & Robert Axelrod, Why We Talk to Terrorists, N.Y. Times, June 30,
2010, at A31 (expressing concern that HLP will hinder scholarship).
248. See Zick, The First Amendment in Transborder Perspective, supra note 6, at 948 (arguing that
the HLP decision could impede “peace-building efforts” by American citizens working in Afghanistan
and elsewhere).
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about the legality of instructing DFTOs in the use of international law.
Chief Justice Roberts noted that the plaintiffs themselves had used these
250
terms in their pleadings. However, as the plaintiffs had consistently
argued that the terms were vague, this observation merely highlighted
the question of what the statutory language meant. In particular, the
plaintiffs were concerned about discerning the dividing line between
training in a “specific skill,” which the statute prohibits, and training that
251
entails “general” instruction, which the statute permits. Chief Justice
Roberts’s only direct answer was that vagueness doctrine’s “person of
ordinary intelligence” would understand that training in the use of
international law “to peacefully resolve disputes” involves a “specific
252
skill,” and thus falls within the statute’s prohibition. However, the
opinion failed to make clear whether this congruence with ordinary
perception flowed from the functional effect of the interaction between
teacher and student on the DFTO’s operations, or from the substantive
difficulty of the subject matter.
The functional-substantive distinction was central to the question of
vagueness, as it was to the First Amendment status of speech that
253
enhanced a DFTO’s “legitimacy.” The functional usage of “training”
254
would prohibit much teaching that involves such interaction, but would
provide plain guidance to those affected. The substantive sense, however,
lacks such clarity, because basic knowledge can be imparted on virtually
any subject: witness the ubiquity of Wikipedia, which indeed has an entry
255
on international law. Presumably, sending a representative of a DFTO
a link to Wikipedia would not trigger prosecution, but a purely
substantive meaning of teaching or instruction makes that assessment a
256
guess about prosecutors’ proclivities, not a product of legal analysis.

249. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721.
250. Id. at 2720–21.
251. Id. at 2721.
252. Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1972)).
253. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
254. At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor suggested that Congress could not have intended to
prohibit teaching a skill wholly unrelated to the DFTO’s activities, such as playing the harmonica. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498)
[hereinafter HLP Argument]. Then-Solicitor General Kagan responded that the harmonica was really
a red herring, since “there are not a whole lot of people going around trying to teach Al-Qaeda how to
play harmonica.” Id. Justice Scalia hinted at the breadth of the functional concept, observing that
“Mohamed Atta and his harmonica quartet might tour the country and make a lot of money.” Id.
255. See International Law, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011).
256. The majority declined to address other examples, such as teaching geography, cited by the
plaintiffs to show the vagueness of the language in § 2339B. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at
2721. According to the majority, these examples were purely hypothetical because the plaintiffs had
not indicated an interest in teaching geography. Id. Therefore, the majority asserted, discussion of such
hypotheticals had no relevance to a preenforcement challenge, where the relevant conduct was the
precise activity that the plaintiffs wished to perform, as noted in their complaint. Id.
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A. Addressing Vagueness by Requiring an Agency Relationship
While Chief Justice Roberts could have offered clearer guidance on
the plaintiffs’ plans, his opinion read as a whole identified the functional
sense as a blueprint for future decisions. The opinion signaled that
“training” and the other types of human capital in § 2339B hinge on
interaction between the defendant and a DFTO that approximates an
agency relationship. The primary indication that courts should look for
an agency relationship emerged in the discussion of the statutory term
“service.” For Chief Justice Roberts, service resembled agency as a
relationship or course of conduct that implies direction and control by
another. The opinion reinforced this view by citing the dictionary
definition of service as “the performance of work commanded or paid for
by another: a servant’s duty: attendance on a superior” or “an act done
257
for the benefit or at the command of another.” This definition tracks
258
the common law definition of agency. Chief Justice Roberts also
suggested at two points in the opinion that the various prohibited forms
259
of material support have common attributes. Given this view, the
indicia of service also should inform definitions of “training” and “expert
advice.”
From this perspective, training prohibited by the statute should
entail some kind of interactive relationship with the group. For example,
a DFTO, such as Hamas, that wished to exploit an agent’s knowledge of
international humanitarian law would pose specific questions about the
percentage of operatives it could safely house at a supposedly “civilian”
site to maintain the site’s legal protection from attack. Any answer other
than “zero percent” would give Hamas a tactical advantage, by
encouraging it to continue using civilians as human shields for its
260
operatives. Whatever the trainer’s intent, Congress has a legitimate
interest in barring such interaction. In contrast, merely providing a group

257. Id. (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075 (1993)); see also id. at 2722
(defining “service” to include activity “performed in coordination with, or at the direction of” a
DFTO).
258. See supra note 49. An inference from another of the statute’s definitions also points to a
narrow definition of service. Congress defined the term “personnel” to exclude independent advocacy.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2010) (“Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist
organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign
terrorist organization’s direction and control.”). Anyone who provides a service could plausibly be
viewed as “personnel.” As Chief Justice Roberts noted, Congress’s carve out of independent advocacy
in defining “personnel” would not make sense if Congress viewed independent advocacy as a
prohibited “service.” Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722.
259. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722 (asserting that “service,” like “lodging,”
“weapons,” “explosives,” and “transportation,” cannot be supplied “independently” of a DFTO); see
id. at 2718 (concluding that all prohibited forms of material support should require the same level of
intent).
260. See Blank, supra note 211, at 290–91.
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with a widely available book, such as an international law treatise by
Grotius or Vattel, would not meet the test.
In addition, under the statute training must be provided to a DFTO,
261
such as the PKK or Hamas. As Chief Justice Roberts explained, “use of
the word ‘to’ indicates a connection” between the service and the
262
DFTO. In other words, the training cannot merely be instruction that a
defendant provides to a broadly heterogeneous group, even if that group
includes some members of a DFTO. To demonstrate this connection, the
government should have to show that the defendant had accepted
payment from the DFTO for this purpose, or offered the training at the
DFTO’s request in a forum that the DFTO sponsors. This kind of
DFTO-sponsored forum offers the maximum opportunity for the
manipulation that Congress wished to combat.
The avoidance canon strengthens the case for narrow definitions of
“training” and “expert advice.” As Chief Justice Roberts noted, Congress
expressly exempted independent advocacy because it wished to steer
263
clear of constitutional difficulties. Any workable test, therefore, must
clearly distinguish between independent advocacy and prohibited conduct.
Such a test would have to require more than the mere existence of
contacts with a DFTO. The government conceded in HLP that § 2339B
did not “prevent [the plaintiffs] from becoming members of [a DFTO] or
264
impose any sanction on them for doing so.” However, even a symbolic
species of membership, which does not include payment of membership
dues, involves nominal contacts with the DFTO. A test keyed to contacts
265
would thus clash with the statute’s membership carve out.
If mere contacts alone cannot destroy the safe harbor of
independent advocacy, courts need a distinct test to provide guidance
266
and avoid the problem of vagueness. The agency concept fills the gap.

261. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)).
262. Id. at 2722. A simple coincidence of views, without more, between a speaker and a DFTO
should not suffice to demonstrate the kind of connection required. Neither should agreement, tacit or
express, on political goals. In this sense, the standard under § 2339B is more demanding, for instance,
than the standard for price-fixing in antitrust law. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (holding that a violation requires “unity of purpose or a common design and
understanding”); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954)
(noting that “conscious parallelism” is evidence of a violation, but is not sufficient in and of itself).
263. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723.
264. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. This conclusion dovetails with the Cold War avoidance cases. In Rowoldt v. Perfetto, for
example, the Court required that when the government seeks to deport a noncitizen, it must show a
“meaningful association” with the Communist Party. 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957). The Court pointedly
declined to find such a link, even where the petitioner had joined the Party and briefly had run a
business that the Party sponsored. Id. at 117–18.
266. The vagueness doctrine requires that the statute set a boundary between lawful and unlawful
conduct that is discernible by a “person of ordinary intelligence.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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It informs the test with a centuries-long pedigree in common law and,
through its link to “service,” an anchor in Chief Justice Roberts’s
267
opinion.
These narrow definitions of “training” and “service” also deal with a
concern, raised by critics of the HLP decision, that prosecutors could
now target journalistic decisions, such as a newspaper’s decision to
publish an op-ed piece by a Hamas leader purporting to announce a
268
cease-fire. Under the narrow definition posited above, categorizing this
journalistic decision as “material support” would be problematic.
Starting with the law’s protection for independent advocacy illustrates
the point. Under the statute, an individual with a copy of the Hamas
leader’s speech could stand on a soapbox in the public square and praise
the speech profusely. In contrast, the newspaper’s publication of the
piece would carry no such express or implicit endorsement, since
newspapers routinely print op-ed pieces representing a wide spectrum of
opinion. If the soapbox speaker’s advocacy is independent, the
newspaper’s activity is even more so. Moreover, the newspaper clearly is
269
Instead, the newspaper is
not providing a service “to” Hamas.
providing a service to its readers in spurring public debate, as it does with
the rest of its editorial content. This role also rebuts any claim that the
newspaper specifically intends to aid Hamas. While publication of the
op-ed may provide some benefit to Hamas by enabling it to reach an
audience that would otherwise not consider its views, this benefit is
270
purely incidental to the newspaper’s goal of spurring public debate.
Similarly, individuals would be free to offer a course on
international humanitarian law open to students who met neutral
requirements, such as age, educational prerequisites, or ability to pay.

267. See United States v. Farhane, 643 F.3d 127, 143–144 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the statute
was not vague as applied to a physician who offered to serve as an “on-call doctor” for Al Qaeda).
Even before HLP, courts had found that the term “service” was “by and large, a word of common
understanding and one that could not be used for selective or subjective enforcement.” See
Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2006),
aff’d, 578 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. United States (Al
Haramain I), No. 07-1155, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103373, at *50–52 (D. Ore. Nov. 5, 2009) (finding no
vagueness in 31 C.F.R. § 594.406(b), which bars unauthorized provision of “legal, accounting,
financial, brokering, freight forwarding, transportation, public relations, educational, or other
services”). Courts and agencies have also readily distinguished between coordinated and
uncoordinated activities in the campaign finance arena. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)
(per curiam) (upholding limits on campaign spending coordinated with a candidate, as opposed to
independent spending). The Court may have erred as a substantive matter in holding that the First
Amendment bars limits on independent spending; the point here is that a corpus of case law makes
this distinction.
268. See, e.g., Cole, The Roberts Court vs. Free Speech, supra note 6, at 80.
269. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22.
270. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After
Garcetti, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1531, 1546 (2008) (noting the importance of transparency in government
and the media’s role in promoting that objective).
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Enrolled students could include students who happened to be members
of a DFTO. Such a course of study would not violate § 2339B, so long as
the provider did not restrict enrollment, recruitment, or publicity to
members of the group. The HLP plaintiffs could also participate in a
conference cosponsored by both a DFTO and moderate groups. Here,
too, the more inclusive nature of the audience would rebut a charge that
the plaintiffs were providing aid “to” a DFTO. Organizations, such as the
Carter Center, that mediate disputes between governments and non-state
actors would also comply with the law. Mediation might entail private
sessions with a DFTO as part of an initial push to persuade the DFTO of
the value of mediation, or as a technique during mediation to identify
areas of contention and common ground. Mediation involves mutual
commitments by the DFTO and the government it opposes and confers
no special advantage on the DFTO. For this reason, activity reasonably
related to mediation efforts would not constitute assistance “to a foreign
271
terrorist organization.” Indeed, by encouraging such cross-over events,
§ 2339B echoes Justice Stevens’s praise of disclosure requirements in
272
Meese v. Keene as promoting “more speech.”
B. Straddling the Domestic and International Realms: The Case
of Specially Designated Global Terrorists
A narrow interpretation of material support also clarifies an area in
which domestic and international realms overlap: the regulation of
273
SDGTs are
specially designated global terrorists (“SDGTs”).
individuals or entities present in this country that the government
274
believes have helped funnel money to DFTOs. As a result, the
government blocks the SDGT’s transfer and receipt of assets and
275
services. As a threshold matter, an individual or entity that wishes to
assist the SDGT must specify in its preenforcement challenge the
276
conduct it wishes to perform. As a substantive matter, however,

271. See Peter Margulies, Accountable Altruism: The Impact of the Federal Material Support Statute
on Humanitarian Aid, 34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 539, 556 (2011).
272. See 481 U.S. 465, 481 (1986). A clear and capacious safe harbor also serves policy goals, by
reassuring communities whose cooperation is crucial for effective counterterrorism. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq,
The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 833, 896–97
(2011) (arguing that the use of religious affiliation as an index of terrorist proclivity is problematic on
constitutional and policy grounds); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and
Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 Law & Society Rev.
365, 372 (2010) (discussing the positive effects of a perception of legitimacy on cooperation with law
enforcement). See generally Lawrence Rosenthal, The Law Professor as Counterterrorist Tactician,
89 Tex. L. Rev. 113, 120–21 (2011).
273. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.310 (2011) (citing Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1(d)(i), 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002))
(defining “SDGT”).
274. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.201–206 (2011).
275. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.409 (barring “donation of . . . services” to SDGTs).
276. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2010).
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because the government has greater control over the SDGT’s funding,
the fungibility of services is less important than in the international
277
realm.
In one recent post-HLP decision, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation,
Inc. v. United States Department of the Treasury, the Ninth Circuit gave
the plaintiffs too much leeway on the threshold issue, and as a
substantive matter interpreted a federal regulation too broadly, resulting
278
in a finding that the regulation was unconstitutional. In Al Haramain,
the court held that regulations prohibiting material support of SDGTs
were unconstitutional as applied to a group that asserted at oral
argument that it wished to conduct joint press conferences with Al279
Haramain to protest its designation. Al-Haramain (“AHIF”) had been
placed on the list because it had used resources to finance rebels in
280
Chechnya, had carried on its board of directors two individuals who
had been found to have assisted terrorist groups with financial
281
contributions, and had been affiliated with a Saudi organization that
282
had also contributed financial support to terrorist groups. Two issues
relevant to HLP were present in Al Haramain: (1) whether the plaintiffs
alleged their planned coordination with AHIF with sufficient specificity
to support a preenforcement challenge, and (2) whether the court was
right to hold that the regulations barring material support to a SDGT
were unconstitutional as applied. I examine each in turn.
The Al Haramain court failed to provide sufficient guidance on the
threshold issue of the specificity required of plaintiffs in a
preenforcement challenge. In HLP, the Supreme Court emphasized that
plaintiffs in a preenforcement challenge must specifically articulate the
nature and scope of their proposed coordination with a designated
283
284
entity. This “specific articulation” by plaintiffs is a proxy for the
factual predicate that would be available in an appeal from a criminal
285
conviction. It therefore helps courts avoid issuing advisory opinions in

277. Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Al Haramain II), No. 1035032, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *87–88 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011).
278. Id. at *95–96.
279. Id. at *85.
280. Id. at *10–11.
281. Id. at *21–28 (affirming the district court’s finding that substantial evidence supported the
designation); see also Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Al Haramain I),
No. 07-1155, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103373, at *12 (D. Ore. Nov. 5, 2009) (noting the actions of
director Soliman Al-Buthe, who in March 2000 personally delivered $150,000 in traveler’s checks and
a cashier’s check from Al Haramain to its Saudi parent under circumstances that supported an
inference that he intended to provide financial support for terrorist activities in Chechnya).
282. Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *14–15.
283. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2010).
284. Id.
285. Id. (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965)); cf. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law,
Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1410 n.332 (2010) (discussing the

Margulies_63-HLJ-455 (Do Not Delete)

January 2012]

1/24/2012 6:08 PM

ADVISING TERRORISM

505

286

the preenforcement context. The Supreme Court held that some of the
HLP plaintiffs’ claims, including their plan to “offer their services to
287
advocate on behalf of the rights of the Kurdish people,” did not
288
provide the requisite specificity.
The Al Haramain court misapplied the Supreme Court’s standard in
holding that the plaintiffs in that case had met the “specific articulation”
test. In their complaint, the plaintiffs had claimed that they wished “to
speak out . . . in support of AHIF’s designation challenge and . . . work
on AHIF’s behalf and for its benefit, by speaking to the press, holding
289
demonstrations, and contacting the government.” This description of
generalized advocacy offered no more precision than the HLP plaintiffs’
290
plan to speak for “the Kurdish people.” Yet the Al Haramain court
wrongly viewed it as meeting the Supreme Court’s rigorous
291
The Al Haramain plaintiffs also averred in their
requirements.
appellate brief that they wished to “organiz[e] public education activities
292
in conjunction with” AHIF. Here, too, however, the plaintiffs failed to
provide the requisite specificity. Their plans could have entailed
collaboration on the selection of topics and speakers for public events or
could have entailed more elaborate coordination, such as reimbursing
vendors selected by AHIF. The latter activity would have circumvented
the Treasury Department order blocking AHIF’s spending. The broad
description in the brief gave no clue about the scope of the coordination
contemplated. It therefore exacerbated the advisory nature of
preenforcement challenges in precisely the fashion that the Supreme
293
Court sought to avoid. At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that
one of his clients wished to coordinate media outreach, including a press
294
conference, with AHIF. This claim was more specific. However,
responses at oral argument are too casual and contingent to fend off the
dangers of advisory opinions to which the Supreme Court alluded in
295
HLP.

temptation for a party to engage in strategic behavior in a preenforcement challenge to administrative
rules where the factual record is sparse).
286. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) (holding that a dispute about
regulations is typically not ripe for adjudication until the regulation has been applied “to the
claimant’s situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him”).
287. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722.
288. Id. at 2729.
289. See Complaint at 24, Al Haramain I, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103373 (No. 07-1155).
290. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722.
291. See Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *84.
292. Id. at *84–85 (alteration in original).
293. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722.
294. Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *85.
295. The Ninth Circuit panel also noted that the government had not asserted that the plaintiffs
had been insufficiently precise. Id. However, this is not entirely accurate. The government did refer to
this point at the oral argument. See Oral Argument at 54:00–56:00, Al Haramain II, U.S. App. LEXIS
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Moving beyond the threshold point of clarity in a preenforcement
challenge, the Ninth Circuit correctly viewed the First Amendment as
protecting incidental contact with a SDGT that is reasonably related to
296
an independent expression of opinion. Consider the modest contact
mentioned above, involving the selection of topics and speakers for a
conference on Islam or cosponsorship of a press conference criticizing
297
the SDGT’s designation. Conveying information to the public about
Islam is political and religious speech, which the government cannot
298
curb. In the foreign setting, where the U.S. government cannot control
a party’s assets, a conference might turn into a fundraising opportunity
for a terrorist group. In the domestic context, in contrast, once the
government has issued a blocking order for a SDGT, such opportunities
299
evaporate. Any goodwill accrued by the SDGT would be useful only in
prompting reconsideration of the SDGT’s designation—a goal protected
by the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, the panel was precipitous in striking down federal
regulations that bar provision of material support to a SDGT. Because
any benefit to the SDGT would be incidental to the expression of
independent political opinion, the court should have invoked the
avoidance canon and viewed the religious or press conference examples
as not entailing aid “to” the SDGT within the meaning of the
300
regulations. The regulations’ reference to “material . . . support . . . to”
301
a SDGT left abundant room for this narrow reading, which would have
obviated the extreme step of invalidating the rules.
C. Lawyers as Agents for Democracy
This still leaves the question of whether the bar on “expert advice”
in § 2339B applies to legal advice. Two noted scholars have argued that
the language and logic of HLP suggests an affirmative answer to this
302
question. This result, however, would clash with lawyers’ crucial role as

19498 (No. 10-35032), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=
0000007126. In any case, the issuance of advisory opinions is a jurisdictional flaw, which the court may
identify on its own, without the prompting of a party. See Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark Mall Corp.,
644 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2011).
296. See Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *91.
297. Id. at *91–93.
298. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969); Stone, supra note 181, at 191–94.
299. See Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *91–93.
300. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2010) (defining “service” as
“work commanded or paid for by another”).
301. See Exec. Order No. 13224, § 1(d)(i), 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002).
302. See Knake, supra note 11, at 656–57 (noting the likely “chilling effect” of the Court’s holding
in HLP on lawyers’ advice to DFTOs); Tarkington, supra note 63, at 41 (“The [HLP]
Court . . . forbids [attorneys] from speaking as attorneys to assist others by providing legal advice or
access to international human rights law.”).
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intermediaries between the government and the people. Prohibiting
legal advice would conflict with the avoidance canon, the Court’s
precedents on lawyers, and Chief Justice Roberts’s previously expressed
304
views on fairness in adjudication. Moreover, the special role of lawyers
as officers of the court would minimize asymmetries in information
favoring terrorist groups. In light of these factors, the best reading of
both HLP and § 2339B would allow a lawyer challenging the terrorist
designation of a group to provide advice reasonably related to the
representation, including advice that, if offered by a nonlawyer, could be
barred.
The language of the opinion does supply a basis for concern about
the status of legal advice to DFTOs. Chief Justice Roberts asserted that
§ 2339B bars communication of “advice derived from ‘specialized
305
knowledge’—for example, training on the use of international law.”
Looking at this language in isolation might elicit the conclusion that the
statute bars legal advice of this nature. However, context tells a different
tale.
Given the statute’s text, the plaintiffs’ limited claims, and HLP’s
narrow view of preenforcement challenges, it seems unlikely that Chief
Justice Roberts believed that his opinion addressed the provision of
specifically legal advice. As noted above, the Court held that in
preenforcement challenges it would consider only the precise activity
306
that the plaintiffs sought to perform. The HLP plaintiffs did not ask the
Supreme Court to rule that they had the right to provide expressly legal
307
advice or to engage in legal representation in agencies or courts. Nor

303. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer
in the American Democracy, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1611, 1625 (2009).
304. See Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009) (“[T]he ability to grant interim relief
is . . . ‘an historic procedure for preserving rights during the pendency of an appeal . . . .’” (quoting
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942))).
305. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24.
306. Id. at 2722 (holding that a preenforcement challenge requires more than “speculation” about
the precise nature of the plaintiffs’ proposed activities).
307. While the plaintiffs had sought below to provide “legal expertise” in negotiations between the
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, they informed the Court that this claim was moot in light of
the LTTE’s military defeat. Id. at 2716–17. The plaintiffs did not seek to represent any DFTO in a
legal challenge to its terrorist designation. Nor did they seek a license to provide legal representation
and advice pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 597.505, like the license recently sought and obtained by lawyers
for the ACLU to bring a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki, an
American citizen and Muslim cleric living in Yemen and accused of having ties to al Qaeda. See
Lawyers Win Right to Aid U.S. Target, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2010, at A13. The ACLU obtained the
license after al-Awlaki was declared an SDGT. Id. The Court denied the injunction on the grounds
that the plaintiff, al-Awlaki’s father, lacked standing, and that the matter presented a political
question. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35, 52 (D.D.C. 2010). Al-Awlaki was killed in a
missile attack by CIA-operated drones in September 2011. See Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills
U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1.
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does the statute expressly bar legal advice, although it does prohibit a
308
range of other activities.
In pondering the future of legal representation of DFTOs, the
avoidance canon is central. Courts have repeatedly held that legal
representation serves core First Amendment and due process values,
309
acting as a safeguard against arbitrary government action. Such
safeguards are vital in the designation of foreign terrorist organizations,
which imposes substantial consequences on individuals working with the
organization. Designation as a foreign terrorist group will deprive an
organization of the ability to raise money or engage in most agency
relationships in the U.S. Because courts have declined to review
310
designations collaterally in cases under § 2339B, individuals who raise
money or, on the theory embraced by the HLP Court, engage in speechrelated activity as agents of the DFTO face criminal prosecution.
Designation therefore triggers substantial liberty interests. Congress
provided for judicial review to ensure that a designation was based on
substantial evidence. Lawyers for an organization challenging a
designation vindicate that right with their expertise and judgment.
While serving in this capacity, lawyers also act as agents of
311
constitutionalism itself, preserving government from the long-term
harm that stems from habits of arbitrariness and haste. As the Court held
in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, excluding lawyers would effectively
312
“insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry.” Presumably,
the Court would apply the avoidance canon to reject an interpretation
313
with such drastic consequences.
308. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2010) (barring training and expert advice and assistance, but
not expressly prohibiting legal representation).
309. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–48 (2001); cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 428 (1978) (protecting ACLU lawyers’ communications with prospective clients regarding
constitutional litigation, and noting that, for the ACLU, “‘litigation is not a technique of resolving
private differences’; it is ‘a form of political expression’ and ‘political association’” (citing NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963))). See generally Knake, supra note 11 (discussing the First
Amendment basis for legal representation); Sabbeth, supra note 85 (same); Tarkington, supra note 63
(same).
310. See United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005).
311. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (discussing the lawyer’s role in democracy).
312. See 531 U.S. at 545–46. Congress could require lawyers to obtain a license to advise and
represent DFTOs, as is required to represent SDGTs. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.505 (2011). To meet First
Amendment requirements, however, such a license would have to be content neutral and available on
a provisional basis upon the lawyer’s request, at least in cases seeking preliminary relief. See AlAulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1 (denying a request for an injunction against an alleged targeted killing
effort). This would render a licensing requirement for legal representation in a designation challenge
closer to the requirement of a notice of appearance that every tribunal imposes on lawyers, and to the
foreign-agent registration requirements that the Court has already upheld. See Meese v. Keene, 481
U.S. 465, 469–70 (1987); see also supra notes 138–46 and accompanying text (discussing Keene).
313. But see Tarkington, supra note 63, at 52–53 (arguing that HLP does apply to legal advice and
representation). A portion of Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that because the plaintiffs also wished to
speak before Congress, the majority opinion limited domestic speech. See Holder v. Humanitarian
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Chief Justice Roberts’s sympathy with this view emerged in his
opinion in Nken v. Holder, which held that statutory limits on a court’s
ability to grant a stay of deportation pending adjudication on the merits
314
require a clear statement from Congress. Congress had imposed severe
315
conditions on injunctions regarding deportation. The government
argued that a stay was merely one type of injunction and therefore was
316
covered by the restrictions. Chief Justice Roberts disagreed, noting that
a stay of deportation, unlike an injunction, did not require any
317
interference with the functioning of the executive branch. A stay
merely gave courts the time necessary to make an orderly and accurate
318
decision. Modifying this element of courts’ inherent power would
319
require a clear statement from Congress. Since courts also have the
power to appoint a legal representative for a party to ensure the fairness
320
and accuracy of adjudication, a statute that could be read to prohibit
exercise of this authority would similarly prompt invocation of a clear
statement rule.
Even supposing that the Court would read § 2339B as not applying
to legal representation of a DFTO challenging its designation, related

Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2732 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the majority declined to
reach the issue of whether § 2339B could constitutionally limit advocacy or the provision of
information to Congress. See id. at 2722 (majority opinion) (holding only that the plaintiffs had not
provided a sufficiently concrete description of advocacy before Congress to prevail in a
preenforcement challenge). On Congress’s wide latitude in seeking information, see Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (reaffirming the broad discretion of Congress in
investigations), and compare Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight,
2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 915, 951–59 (arguing that members of Congress on intelligence committees have a
constitutional right to advice from staff lawyers, even though legislation limits access to sensitive
information to members themselves). Justice Breyer did note the government’s insistence that filing an
amicus brief would constitute material support. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). But see infra notes 321–28 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court’s reasoning
would protect the submission of amicus briefs). The Court has on at least one occasion held that a
claimant’s interest in receipt of government benefits is a property interest that does not require the
same solicitude for the attorney’s role as in cases involving liberty interests. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332–33 (1985) (upholding limits on attorney’s fees in veteran’s
benefit cases, while acknowledging that such limits might not be appropriate in a case involving
welfare benefits necessary for subsistence). However, the liberty interests at stake in designation cases
are of far greater magnitude. Moreover, the statute at issue in Walters only limited legal fees; it did not
bar pro bono legal representation or restrict the lawyer’s substantive arguments.
314. 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1759–60 (2009).
315. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2010) (“[N]o court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to
a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry
or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.”).
316. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756.
317. Id. at 1757–59.
318. See id. at 1757 (“The choice for a reviewing court should not be between justice on the fly or
participation in what may be an ‘idle ceremony.’” (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316
U.S. 4, 10 (1942))).
319. Id. at 1757–60.
320. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647 (1985).
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issues prompt further questions. One question addressed at the HLP
argument but reserved in the Court’s decision was the filing of an amicus
brief on behalf of a DFTO. The other is the scope of advice that a lawyer
could provide in the course of representing a DFTO challenging its
designation.
The amicus-brief issue first received notice at the Ninth Circuit,
when the government argued that filing an amicus brief in support of a
321
DFTO would constitute material support. While the Ninth Circuit
322
viewed such a prohibition as constitutionally infirm, then-Solicitor
General Kagan reiterated the government’s view during the Supreme
323
Court argument. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion did not resolve the
issue. The Chief Justice noted that the plaintiffs had not indicated their
intention to file an amicus brief, making analysis premature in the
324
context of a preenforcement challenge. However, Chief Justice Roberts
did not quarrel with the Ninth Circuit’s view that filing an amicus brief
325
for a DFTO could constitute “protected advocacy.”
Amicus briefs also fare well in the balancing of information
asymmetries. An amicus brief does not merely help the group submitting
the brief; it helps the court as well. A well-written amicus brief provides
insights that the court might not obtain from the parties to the case. A
DFTO such as the Iranian group MEK, which has on occasion enjoyed
326
the protection of the U.S. government, could offer a useful perspective
to a court reviewing the government’s designation of another
organization. In contrast, no information asymmetries favoring DFTOs
flow from permitting amicus briefs. Amicus briefs address questions of
law, decided by courts. As in the pretrial publicity setting, courts are able
to cull the wheat from the chaff. Submission of an amicus brief therefore
entails the same minimal risk of deception or manipulation as public
327
comments before a bench trial. A court can deny permission to a group

321. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2009).
322. Id.
323. HLP Argument, supra note 254, at 47–51 (arguing that the statute would bar a DFTO from
“hir[ing] a lawyer to write an amicus brief on its behalf” but that a lawyer could independently submit
an amicus brief that happened to coincide with the DFTO’s views); see also id. at 51 (acknowledging
constitutional claims regarding the right to counsel in certain criminal, habeas, and civil cases, and
suggesting that the statute should be read to preserve such rights).
324. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2010).
325. Id. (quoting Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 930).
326. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(noting, in the course of requiring a more precise explanation from the Secretary of State of evidence
supporting the designation and an opportunity for the DFTO to rebut this evidence, an Iranian
dissident DFTO’s claims that it had cooperated with U.S. authorities in Iraq); cf. Tim Arango, Iranian
Exile Group Poses Vexing Issue for U.S. in Iraq, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2011, at A5 (discussing U.S.
efforts to persuade members of a group to leave a camp in Iraq after a raid by the Iraqi Army killed
dozens of camp residents).
327. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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whose proposed brief is tendentious and uninformative. Courts have long
possessed this power, as well as the power to solicit amicus briefs from
328
those, including the executive branch, with an interest in a matter. As
in Nken, restricting this option in the court’s repertoire should require a
clear statement from Congress.
Since asymmetries in information pose no obstacle, the main
question is what constitutional values are served by an amicus brief.
Because an amicus brief does not involve a party whose liberty or
property are directly at stake, an amicus brief has a weaker link to
procedural values than the stay that the Nken Court preserved. However,
if a DFTO includes U.S. citizens who would risk prosecution if a court
upheld the government’s action, the DFTO’s amicus vindicates those
citizens’ right to speak and therefore serves First Amendment values that
a court should respect.
The question of advice is even more complicated. We have already
seen that an agent of a DFTO who enhances the group’s reputation for
caring about the law could help net more cash contributions. However,
limiting the advice furnished by an attorney assisting the DFTO in a
challenge to its designation would have adverse consequences for both
due process and the First Amendment. An attorney might find it difficult
to represent a DFTO in a challenge to its designation without offering
advice on related issues. For example, suppose leaders of a DFTO
suggested that to make the best case for a challenge, they would forsake
violence. The DFTOs’ leaders then asked the lawyer to advise them on
whether this shift would affect the posture of international organizations
such as the United Nations or the legal duties of the government the
DFTO opposed. Just as the legal-services lawyers in Velazquez could
only do their job if they could “present all the reasonable and well329
grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case,” a
lawyer for a DFTO would have to provide this advice to meet her duty of
330
competence under the American Bar Association’s rules. However,
reading § 2339B to prohibit such advice would expose the lawyer to
prosecution. Intimidated by the prospect of prosecution for providing
advice in the course of legal representation, attorneys might fear
representing DFTOs in challenges to their designations. The logic of
Velazquez would make this result problematic under the First
Amendment. Since drawing the line between permissible and
impermissible representation would be virtually impossible, the statute
also would be unconstitutionally vague as applied. To resolve these
328. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role
in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1354 (2010) (describing the Court’s invitations to
the Solicitor General to provide the U.S.’s view on whether the Court should grant certiorari).
329. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545–46 (2001).
330. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2011).
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problems, a court should read the statute as allowing advice reasonably
related to a designation challenge.
One objection to this dispensation for lawyers might be that it
renders the statute underinclusive because information on the law
provided by laypersons can serve the same beneficial purposes.
However, these arguments ignore the compelling state interests served
by the lawyer-layperson distinction. As “key participants in
331
professionals accept obligations, including
the . . . justice system,”
332
333
candor toward the tribunal, competence, and the duty to refrain from
334
counseling a client to engage in illegal conduct. The inclusion of such
duties in the canons of legal ethics inspires a higher level of trust for
lawyers. For example, a lawyer could not advise a DFTO that civilians
were appropriate targets because they were somehow complicit in
government repression. Such a dismissal of the many legal protections
for civilians in domestic and international law would not constitute
competent legal advice. Similarly, suppose a DFTO leader asked about
the percentage of operatives it could install at a supposedly “civilian” site
without compromising the site’s civilian status. Since harboring any
operatives at the site would constitute use of civilians as human shields, a
lawyer would have to answer “zero percent.” Finally, like the measures
that the Court upheld in Milavetz and in Meese v. Keene, allowing
lawyers to enter into agency relationships with DFTOs combats
335
information asymmetries. A layperson can conceal her agent status and
thus appear independent. In contrast, a lawyer who assists a DFTO in
challenging its designation must disclose her role by filing a notice of
appearance with the court, as would any other attorney. By listening to a
lawyer who has disclosed her role, the public can more accurately gauge
336
the lawyer’s reliability and discount her claims. While such disclosure
does not eliminate asymmetries in information, it helps narrow these
gaps and therefore enhances public debate.

V. The Virtues of Hybrid Scrutiny
Adding capacious safe harbors to the rules of the road does not
shoehorn HLP into the usual doctrinal rubric. HLP stands out in modern
First Amendment case law; it reaches a different result that is more
331. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991).
332. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 (2011).
333. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2011).
334. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2011).
335. See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text (discussing Milavetz); supra notes 138–46
(discussing Keene); cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915–16 (2010) (upholding the
requirement that independent political advertisements disclose funding sources because “the public
has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election”).
336. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.3 (2011) (requiring lawyers to make “reasonable
efforts” to inform third parties that the lawyer does not represent their interests).
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receptive to a limited form of content regulation and cites justifications
that are less concrete. However, the decision is not the outlier that critics
claim. It draws from clear strands in the case law as well as methods that
span disparate doctrines.
A. The Ubiquity of Ex Ante Justifications
One feature of HLP is its adoption of an ex ante perspective to
justify content regulation. For example, the Court found that curbing
agency relationships with DFTOs will promote international cooperation
337
against terrorism. Justice Breyer, in dissent, suggested that this brand
338
of argument was unduly speculative. However, viewed against the
backdrop of constitutional law in general and First Amendment cases in
particular, ex ante arguments have a solid pedigree.
An ex ante perspective poses David Hume’s question: “What must
become of the world, if such practices prevail? How could society subsist
339
under such disorders?” While Hume’s central concern in this passage
340
was the ruin that would follow from abolition of private property,
courts across the landscape of constitutional law fashion rulings that
frame incentives for compliance with legal norms and reduce negative
341
externalities. Separation of powers cases, for example, turn on factors
that will curb overreaching by each of the three branches while ensuring
342
a “workable government.” As John Marshall noted in his speech to
Congress, proper framing of these incentives, particularly in the complex
domain of foreign affairs, sometimes requires that the judiciary stay its
343
hand. Incentivizing reciprocity among sovereign states also undergirds

337. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010); supra notes 226–35 and
accompanying text.
338. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2738.
339. See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 26–27 (Tom L.
Beauchamp ed., 1998). For a more recent account, see Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post,
13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 123 (2003).
340. See Hume, supra note 339, at 96 (noting that the ability to own property “promotes public
utility and . . . civil society”). Preserving the system of property rights from hasty legislative impulses
was a central concern of the Framers, as well. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 83, at 470.
341. Justice Breyer’s perspective often takes a pragmatist turn, which does not square with his
skepticism in HLP about the continuum of financial and human capital for terrorist groups. Justice
Breyer has alluded to an analogous continuum in the past, discussing the Court’s institutional capital.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157–58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the “public’s
confidence” in the Supreme Court as a “treasure” that the Court must safeguard if it is to act
effectively in the future); see also Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic
Constitution 18 (2005) (discussing the importance of considering the social and political
consequences of decisions).
342. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.
concurring).
343. See 10 Annals of Cong. 611 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) (warning against intrusive
judicial scrutiny of extradition requests); cf. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (declining to
enjoin the transfer to Iraqi authorities of an American citizen accused of committing crimes in Iraq,
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deference to Congress in areas such as immigration. Moreover, the
political-question doctrine encourages parties to resolve differences
about foreign policy through public debate, free of the specter of hasty
345
judicial intervention. In addition, courts have curbed damages actions
against officials in national security matters to temper hindsight bias that
346
might chill official decisionmaking. Evidentiary privileges, some of
which have constitutional implications, also turn on an assumption that
defeating truth in the courtroom will yield socially beneficial conduct
347
elsewhere.
Ex ante concerns are no stranger to First Amendment jurisprudence.
To give the political branches a chance to frame rules of the road
internationally, courts permit the government to bar the entry of a
348
foreign national whose public remarks will complicate foreign relations.
absent proof that American officials knew that the individual would be subjected to torture, on the
grounds that the “second guess[ing]” of executive determinations by the judiciary would “undermine
the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area”).
344. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (noting that international law has
traditionally viewed a sovereign state’s power to expel foreign nationals as a necessary element of its
ability to obtain concessions from other states regarding treatment of its citizens abroad). Acceptance
of this general proposition does not require an absolute deference to the political branches on
immigration matters. Procedural and substantive safeguards, for example, should still be required
under either the Constitution or legislation that implements the U.S.’s international obligations under
the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
1159, 1162 (2009) (overruling an agency determination that precedent barred refugee status for an
alien who alleged he had been coerced into persecuting others).
345. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–13 (1962) (“[M]any such questions uniquely demand
single-voiced statement of the Government’s views. Yet it is error to suppose that every case . . . which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”); cf. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L.
Rev. 237, 267–68, 329–32 (2002) (discussing the application of the political-question doctrine in foreign
affairs and arguing for greater reliance on it).
346. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding that former Attorney General
John Ashcroft is entitled to qualified immunity for alleged actions at issue in a lawsuit for unlawful
detention under the federal material-witness statute); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43
(2009) (precluding a lawsuit against senior officials by aliens detained and deported after the
September 11 attacks); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (precluding a
lawsuit by an alleged survivor of extraordinary rendition). For more on these types of lawsuits, see
Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the
Rule of Law, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 195 (2010) (arguing that courts should avoid categorical preclusion or
intervention, and instead consider whether damage action would further development of effective
alternatives to overreaching); see also George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on
Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 193, 234–37
(2011) (discussing tort suits against officials as legitimate vehicles for accountability, but cautioning
about negative externalities of such litigation).
347. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
1477, 1533–35 (1999).
348. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–70 (1972) (permitting a bar to entry based on a
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason). However, when the government provides an express
reason, such as the assertion that a foreign national provided material support to a DFTO, it should
confront the applicant with this reason and permit him to offer evidence in rebuttal before denying a
visa request. See Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2009).
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To manage information asymmetries, courts have required disclosure of
349
foreign governments’ sponsorship of movies and other material. Courts
also have enforced bars on disclosure of national security information by
present and former government employees, in part because such curbs,
viewed ex ante, encourage the government to share information among
350
officials who must decide and execute policy. In the domestic realm,
the Supreme Court has permitted regulation of the distribution chain of
child pornography because it determined that such measures were
351
necessary to curb incentives for the production of child pornography.
Courts distinguish between political opinion and speech acts that further
criminal conspiracies, in order to diminish incentives for illegal
352
conduct. Ex ante rationales also play a dual role in the doctrine
353
supporting curbs on pretrial publicity. Such limits encourage advocates
354
to frame their arguments to fit the judicial forum. In addition, limits on
pretrial publicity protect privileged information, which often arises from
355
socially beneficial conduct that privileges seek to encourage.
This modest list of examples demonstrates that HLP’s reliance on
ex ante arguments does not marginalize the Court’s analysis. On the
contrary, the ex ante turn is a familiar trope in precedent on both foreign
affairs and the First Amendment. Few bastions of doctrine would remain
intact if the Court abruptly disclaimed reliance on such reasoning.

349. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480–85 (1987); see also supra notes 138–46 (discussing
Keene).
350. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289 (1981).
351. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–60 (1982). But see United States v. Stevens, 130 S.
Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010) (declining to extend this rationale to depictions of animal cruelty); see also
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (holding that picketers carrying antigay placards in a
public place near a military funeral could not be sued in tort because their communication regarded a
matter of public concern).
352. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114–15 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the First
Amendment did not prohibit prosecution of the so-called “blind sheik,” when the defendant had
recommended targeting military installations to individuals whom he knew had access to explosives
and who had sought his advice regarding possible targets). For scholarly discussion of the difference
between protected and unprotected speech, see Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of
Language 57–65 (1989) (discussing the doctrinal distinction between political speech and speech in
furtherance of a conspiracy); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1801–02 (2004) (noting
that criminal solicitation is unprotected); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
1095, 1217 (2005) (suggesting a test for distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech
assisting crime).
353. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1054–56 (1991).
354. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
355. See Posner, supra note 347, at 1530–33. The ex ante perspective also figures in “definitional
balancing” that determines what types of communication receive First Amendment protection. See
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1192–93 (1970) (arguing that the importance of encouraging creativity
through protection of intellectual property helps justify copyright’s limits on speech).
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However, ex ante arguments are not trumps for every occasion. As
with the pretrial-publicity context, HLP’s ex ante perspective supports
discrete limits on speech only in particular relationships. In this context,
information asymmetries and the need for rules of the road require such
limits. Ex ante rationales do not justify comprehensive limits on the
expression of ideas.
B. The Virtues of Departing from Doctrine
Within HLP’s parameters, the Court’s holding appropriately trades
off doctrinal elegance for pragmatic results. Doctrinal tests are not
carved in stone. The Court constructs them to send signals to a spectrum
of audiences, including government officials, citizens, and foreign
356
powers. Sometimes, fine-tuning those signals requires flexibility.
In the situation that the Court addressed in HLP, linking a modest
retreat on substantive scrutiny with safe harbors that protect democratic
357
values wins out over rigid adherence to doctrinal commands. For the
Court, the statute’s inclusion of a safe harbor for independent advocacy
served a vital signaling function. By permitting a substantial range of
expression and disclaiming any effort to curb ideas, Congress displayed
an awareness of “its own responsibility to consider how its actions may
358
implicate constitutional concerns.” If one views strict scrutiny as a
359
proxy for concern about the government’s intent, Congress’s signaling
of its capacity for deliberation justified a more relaxed hybrid approach.
Legislatures and agencies fashion rules like this all the time, by
360
linking clear norms with the authority to grant waivers. Only a
mechanical view of judicial decisionmaking would deny that courts
361
engage in that calculus. Courts have always done this in constitutional
356. See Fallon, supra note 40, at 38 (discussing the implementation of constitutional norms and
values that help shape the formulation of legal standards); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 30–50 (2004) (discussing the formulation of prophylactic rules, such
as Miranda, that help prevent violations of constitutional rights); Chesney, supra note 241, at 1392–
1402 (discussing factors that influence the framing of doctrine); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution
Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 436–42 (2007) (noting the influence of instrumental and
institutional factors on the construction of doctrinal tests).
357. See Araiza, supra note 8, at 834–35 (arguing that HLP is a pragmatic accommodation of
competing values); cf. Pildes, supra note 40 (discussing virtues of doctrinal flexibility).
358. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010).
359. Cf. Fallon, supra note 40, at 81–82 (noting that the Court may view the likelihood of
reasonable disagreement—as opposed to studied ignorance or animus—as a basis for judicial deference).
360. Indeed, this authority is part of Congress’s comprehensive scheme for addressing terrorist
organizations and other hostile foreign powers. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(c) (2011) (authorizing the
granting of licenses to nongovernmental organizations supplying aid “for the purpose of relieving
human suffering”).
361. See Araiza, supra note 8, at 834–35 (arguing that HLP is a pragmatic solution to a doctrinal
clash); Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing the inevitability of balancing in First Amendment
doctrine); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(warning against “the rigidity dictated by doctrinaire textualism” in separation of powers cases).
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law, although they sometimes disguise their handiwork as a function of
362
the law of remedies rather than as a substantive adjustment. Indeed,
without freedom to adjust doctrinal tests, the courts often would be
powerless not just to vindicate legitimate governmental interests but also
to protect vulnerable communities that do not fit neatly into doctrinal
363
pigeonholes. This is too high a price to maintain doctrinal purity.

Conclusion
Analyzing the interaction of counterterrorism measures with the
First Amendment, as the attorney example illustrates, turns on the scope
of asymmetries in information and the corresponding need for rules of
the road. When a measure allows government to better manage
asymmetries between the U.S. and foreign powers, courts usually will act
as the Supreme Court did in HLP. However, courts will be less
deferential if the government seems intent on stifling public debate,
independent inquiry, and legal challenges. Courts have issued decisions
along these pragmatic lines instead of paying homage at doctrine’s altar.
To see why an absolutist approach to First Amendment doctrine
would be a mistake, we should consider a familiar example from private
law: two parties looking to make a deal. An agent, such as a lawyer, can
facilitate an agreement, managing the asymmetries in information that
impede an agreement. However, in a nightmare of private bargaining,
the lawyer may intentionally or inadvertently assist her client in
defecting, compounding asymmetries of information and skewing
incentives for cooperation in the future.
The regulation of lawyers illustrates how courts cope pragmatically
with an agency relationship. A decision like Milavetz casts courts as

362. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 82, at 1810–16 (noting the interaction between
substantive doctrine, remedies, and political crosscurrents); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 884–85 (1999) (arguing that over time courts will
define rights such as the right to nondiscriminatory public education or freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment to promote manageable remedial regimes); cf. Fallon, supra note 40, at 49–50
(noting the importance of manageability in shaping doctrine).
363. For example, the quasi-suspect status of gender under the Equal Protection Clause began as a
pragmatic response to inadequacies in existing doctrine. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98
(1976); Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 41–43 (1972); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36
(1996) (applying the usually deferential rational basis review to invalidate a state constitutional
provision that barred relief for victims of discrimination based on sexual orientation); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (striking down a state bar to public education for undocumented noncitizen
children as entrenching on an “area of special constitutional sensitivity,” while acknowledging that
states could impose restrictions on undocumented noncitizens in other contexts, and holding that
education is not a fundamental right); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(applying rational basis review to strike down a provision apparently directed at excluding “hippie
communes” from a food-stamp program); cf. Sunstein, supra note 40 (discussing the need to depart
from doctrine when values conflict).
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managing information asymmetries between lawyer and client through
disclosure mandates, while also upholding regulation that defuses
collective-action problems by enforcing rules of the road. Ethics
regulation of pretrial publicity extends this approach beyond the realm of
commercial speech. Regulation protects the specialized forum of the
judicial system, which channels deliberation through a web of evidentiary
privileges and other constraints. Ethics regulation also provides a safe
harbor for lawyers who keep the state honest by challenging government
policies.
Since the dawn of debate about the Constitution, worry about
information asymmetries between American officials and foreign powers
has affected governing institutions. Provisions of the Constitution such as
the Foreign Gifts Clause owe their inclusion to such anxieties. The
Founding Era also saw a bifurcation of such concerns into two strands.
One was a paranoid strand that, as in the Sedition Act, targeted the
expression of ideas, and the other was a more functional strand
addressing asymmetries in information about the aims of foreign powers.
Since the 1950s, courts have used interpretive devices like the avoidance
canon to thwart the regulation of ideas while upholding tailored
measures that promote moderation and clear signals from foreign
powers.
Global terrorism has made it both more difficult and more
imperative to separate the paranoid and functional strands. Terrorist
groups exploit asymmetries in information as a means of doing business.
DFTOs use the goodwill they earn from nonviolent activities to fund
violence and to cement support for future attacks. Congress passed the
material-support statute to manage the asymmetries in information on
which DFTOs trade. To accomplish this goal, the statute prohibits
agency relationships with DFTOs, even though regulating those
relationships in some manner also limits the content of speech. The
statute meets the test of heightened scrutiny, which can rely both on ex
ante rationales and on insights about DFTOs’ history of using both peace
negotiations and international law for strategic purposes.
However, passing muster under heightened scrutiny also requires
safe harbors for independent advocates, human rights monitors, and
attorneys. Protecting the work of such groups requires a test akin to
agency. Legal representation receives special solicitude because of the
lawyer’s key role as an intermediary between the state and private
parties.
There is an inescapable hybridity to this approach, as there is to the
regulation of lawyers. First Amendment absolutists will reject HLP’s
pragmatic accommodations of this story. Indeed, HLP could still turn out
to be a mistake, if the ominous undertones of the Court’s discussion of
“legitimacy” herald a trimming of the Brandenburg test, or if the
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decision’s studied deference spurs governmental overreaching. However,
the Court’s insistence on safe harbors should neutralize progovernment
information asymmetries and preserve the core virtues of public debate.
That is a worthwhile venture for any constitutional vision.
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